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I. INTRODUCTION
The health care fraud investigation of Columbia/HCA cap-
tured the attention of the media and the public.! The attention
given to health care fraud is not likely to subside; the press, politi-
cians, and the public continue to keep it in the limelight.2 The
government is aggressive in its regulation and investigation of
health care fraud and abuse. It collects enormous fines for im-
proper billing and other operational irregularities under the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs.3
1. See, e.g., CFO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Resigns as Fraud Probe Continues,
STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 9, 1997, at 3D.
2. See Peter Aronson, Lawyers Go On Trial In Fraud Case, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1,
1999, at Al. See also Hearing Finds Extensive Fraud, Abuse in Medicaid (visited Nov.
22, 1999) <http://www.corpcompliance.com/news/whatsnew/newsitems.cfm>;
Philip Connors, Former Insider Helps in Suits Against HMOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26,
1999, at B1.
3. Currently, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of In-
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Health care is a heavily regulated industry. The regulations
governing the provision of health care are extremely complex. As a
result, the health care industry often finds itself baffled in a quag-
mire of ambiguous legislation. In March of 1997, the federal gov-
ernment published corporate compliance program guidelines for
clinical laboratories.4 This resulted in confusion about to what ex-
tent the clinical laboratory guidelines applied to other health care
entities like hospitals. Other health care entities were unsure how
to structure their corporate compliance programs. The Office of
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS-OIG" or "OIG") tried to alleviate the confusion by
publishing corporate compliance guidelines that applied to hospi-
tals.5  The government structured these compliance program
guidelines similar to those for clinical laboratories and the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines.6
Since health care fraud and abuse is a high priority for the
federal government, health care corporations are taking a proactive
approach by choosing to voluntarily implement a corporate com-
pliance program before the federal government mandates one via a
corporate integrity agreement.7 Even if a health care entity already
has a compliance program, it should review the OIG model pro-
gram to learn how the federal government determines the effec-
tiveness of a compliance program.
Part II of this article provides information concerning recent
8actions taken by the government. Part III sets forth the legal issues
involved in structuring a corporate compliance program. Part IV
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of a compliance pro-
spector General has a zero tolerance policy towards fraud and abuse. See Office of
Inspector General, Department of Health & Human Services, OIG Model Compli-
ance Plan for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 9435 (Mar. 3, 1997).
4. See id.
5. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GuIDANCE FOR
HOSPITALS (Feb. 1998). This publication may be downloaded from the Office of
Inspector General's page at the Department of Health and Human Services inter-
net site. See DHHS-OIG (visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/
oig/>. An Acrobat® reader is required.
6. See id. at 6; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt.
n.3(k) (1995).
7. See Deanna Bellandi, Rolling Out The Red Carpet, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept.
29, 1997, at 29, 30.
8. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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gram. Part V establishes the elements of a compliance program as
promulgated by the DHHS-OIG." Finally, Part VI addresses the
development and implementation of a corporate compliance pro-
gram.
II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTION
In 1994, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno proclaimed the in-
vestigation of health care fraud and abuse the number two priority• 13
of the Department of Justice. The government has been quite
successful in its battle against health care fraud and abuse.
A. The Department ofJustice
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") recouped $180 million in
1993 and $411 million through civil litigation in health care fraud
cases in 1994.14 In 1994, the Federal Bureau of Investigation spent
$37 million on health care fraud and abuse investigations, and col-
lected more than $500 million in fines and assessments.15 In 1996,
of the 333 qui tam suits16 brought under the False Claims Act, over
one-half the suits alleged health care fraud.
17
The government recently increased its efforts. In 1997, the
primary goal of the DOJ was to significantly increase the number of
both civil and criminal prosecutors in charge of health care fraud18
cases. According to Debra Cohn, special counsel for health care
to the deputy attorney general, the DOJ will place more health care
fraud investigators in U.S. Attorneys' offices across the country.'9
10. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
11. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
12. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
13. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, FiscAL YEAR
1994, Introduction, § III(A) (1) (Mar. 2, 1995).
14. See Justice Announces $411 Million Recovered in Medical Fraud Probes, Wash.
Insider (BNA), Oct. 12, 1994, at 1.
15. See W. Eugene Basanta et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 31
TORT & INS. L.J. 357, 365 (1996).
16. A qui tam action is an action brought by an informer under a statute
which provides for a civil penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act,
with part of the penalty going to the person who brought the suit and the remain-
der going to the state. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (6th ed. 1991).
17. See DOJ Interest in Looking at More Quality of Care Cases, Official Says, 4
PREVENTION OF CORP. LIABILITY: CURRENT REPORT (BNA), Mar. 10, 1997, at 5.
18. See Thad Davis, Business Crimes Hotline: A Roundup of Recent Cases and Devel-
opments, 12 Bus. CRIME BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LMG. 8, 9 (1997).
19. See id. at 9-10.
19991 1343
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The DOJ will also make sure that there are comparable numbers of
20
prosecutors available to follow through with each prosecution.
In addition, the DOJ plans to have a "health care coordinator"
in every U.S. Attorney's Office, as well as a "health care fraud work-
ing group" in each part of the country to process allegations of
fraud and abuse with representatives from DOJ, Health and Hu-
man Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal
and state anti-fraud entities.21
B. The Department of Health & Human Services - Office of the Inspector
General
DHHS-OIG has a similar goal. Its goal is to extend its investi-
gative and audit staffs to cover all geographical areas in the coun-
ty22 In 1998, DHHS-OIG increased its staff levels from 1,126 to
23 241,258. DHHS/OIG also opened five new investigative offices.
These actions increase the office's ability to conduct rapid national
evaluations that provide policymakers with information, analysis
25and recommendations for improving DHHS programs.
C. The Health Care Fraud & Abuse Control Program
The federal government combats health care fraud and abuse
via the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program. According
to the 1998 Annual Report by the Health Care Fraud and Abuse
26Control Program, the federal government won or negotiated
more than $480 million in judgements, settlements, and adminis-
27
trative impositions in health care fraud cases and proceedings.
The federal government also collected $296 million from health
28care fraud and abuse cases.
In 1998, the United State Attorneys' Offices ("USAOs") filed
20. See id. at 10.
21. See id.
22. See THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE AND THE DEPARTMENT
OFJUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FY 1998 10 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE FRAUD ANNUAL REPORT] (visited
Nov. 7,1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/98hipaaar.htm>.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See HEALTH CARE FRAUD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22.
27. See id. at 7.
28. See id. Of this amount, $271 million was returned to the Medicare Trust
Fund, and $9 million was the federal share of Medicaid restitution. See id.
[Vol. 251344
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322 criminal health care fraud cases.2 This is a fourteen percent
increase from 1997.'o There were 219 criminal health care fraud-
related convictions, involving 326 defendants in 1998.3
Civil enforcement action included the filing of 107 civil cases
in 1998. This is an increase of twenty percent over 1997.33 By the
end of 1998, 3,471 civil matters were still pending.3
The number of individuals and entities excluded from the
Medicare, Medicaid or other federally sponsored health care pro-
grams increased in 1998. In 1998, 3,021 individuals and entities
were excluded3 5  This represents an increase of eleven percent
36
from the 2,700 exclusions in 1997. Many were excluded as a re-
sult of criminal convictions for program-related crimes and crimi-
37
nal convictions for patient abuse or neglect. Others were ex-
cluded based on licensure revocations or other professional
misconduct.3s
III. LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING A CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
It is important to understand that often health care fraud and
abuse is not an intentional act by the health care entity. Some enti-
ties do not have sufficient infrastructure to determine if the organi-
zation is in compliance with the laws. As a result, employees may
inadvertently make mistakes that could cost the health care entity
millions. It has been estimated that losses resulting from fraud and
abuse constitute ten percent of the total cost of health care.39
Previously, instances of mispayment under the federal pro-
grams were resolved by negotiations with the Health Care Financ-
ing Agency ("HCFA") because of a mutual understanding that bill-
ing requirements and criteria were subject to various
29. See id. at 20.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 21.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 20.
35. See id. at 10.
36. See id.
37. See id. There were 584 excluded for program-related crimes and 302 ex-
cluded based on criminal conviction for patient abuse or neglect. See id.
38. See id. There were 1,251 excluded for licensure revocation or other pro-
fessional misconduct. See id.
39. See JANET L. SHIKLES, GAO, HEALTH INSURANCE: LEGAL AND RESOURCE
CONSTRAINTS COMPLICATE EFFORTS TO CURB FRAUD AND ABUSE 10 (1993). The cost
of health care is approximately $800 billion a year. See id.
1999] 1345
7
Ehler-Lejcher: The Expansion of Corporate Compliance: Guidance for Health Care E
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
interpretations.0 However, the Office of the Inspector General
and U.S. Attorney's Offices now view this issue in more of a prose-
cutorial light." Fraud and abuse may result in prosecution under
federal laws such as the False Claims Act, Anti-kickback Statute,
Stark I and Stark II Laws, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act ("RICO"), wire fraud and mail fraud laws, federal
42antitrust laws and other federal, state, and local laws.
Health care fraud and abuse involve activities such as improper
billing, kickbacks for patient referrals, financial incentives and fi-
nancial arrangements. A majority of the fraud and abuse activity
occurs within the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Health care
entities may be reimbursed for services that are covered by these
programs. If a health care entity submits an improper claim for
payment under either program, then the Anti-kickback Statute,
Stark Law, and the False Claims Act may have been violated. Viola-
tions can result in substantial penalties. Penalties may be in the
form of civil monetary penalties, criminal monetary penalties, or
even exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs.45
A health care entity should consider federal, state, and local
law when structuring a corporate compliance program. A compli-
ance program should detect fraud and abuse and implement cor-
rective action that demonstrates a good faith attempt to comply
with the law.
40. See Karen S. Boxer & Helaine Gregory, Compliance is Good for Your Corporate
Health, 943 PLI/CoRP. 353, 359 (1996).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See discussion infra Part III.B.
44. See HEALTH CARE FRAUD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 14. The annual
audit report of HCFA's financial statement estimated that improper Medicare fee-
for- service payment in 1997 were $20 billion, or about 11% of the total $177.4 bil-
lion in fee-for-service payments. See id. Many improper payments were the result
of insufficient or no medical documentation of services, lack of medical necessity,
improper coding, and unallowable services. See id. The audit did not conclude
what payments were attributable to fraud. See id. See generally GAO Official Says Pro-
gram Fraud Could be as High as $20 Billion, 3 Health Care Daily (BNA), at 2, Mar. 5,
1997 (stating that fraud and waste for the Medicare program ranges from $6 bil-
lion to $20 billion per year).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
1346 [Vol. 25
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A. The Anti-kickback Statute
1. The Law
The Anti-kickback law prohibits referrals by a provider of a
federally financed health care service that are made for personal
46economic benefit. The Anti-kickback Statute prohibits an indi-
vidual from "knowingly and willfully solicit[ing] or receiv[ing] any
remuneration... directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind ... in return for referring [or inducing to refer] an indi-
vidual" for services payable under the Medicare or Medicaid pro-
grams.4' The DHHS-OIG has interpreted a referral to include any
action taken by physicians, hospitals, and other health care provid-
ers to influence a patient's decision in the use of health care serv-
* 48ices. Remuneration has been broadly defined to include anything
of value. The statute also prohibits remuneration in "return for
purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending
[or inducing the same] [of] any good, facility, service, or item for
49
which payment may be made. . ." under these programs.
The Anti-kickback Statute requires an intentional act by estab-
lishing that payments be made "knowingly and willfully."50 Courts
apply the "primary purpose" or the stricter "one purpose" test to
determine whether a payment violates the Anti-kickback Statute. If
either the primary purpose or one purpose of the payment is to in-
duce a prohibited referral, then the entire payment is deemed ille-
gal."' Furthermore, if a payment exceeds fair market value, then
the government may presume that the payment was to induce a re-
46. See id.
47. Id. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (1) (A), (2)(A).
48. See Gary W. Eiland, Healthcare Fraud and Abuse, Stark Law, and Federal
False Claim Act Update, Presentation at the National Health Lawyers Associa-
tion/American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys ("NHLA/AAHA") Conference
(Nov. 4-5 1997), at 14.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (1) (B), (2)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
50. See id. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (1) (A), (2)(A); see also Eiland, supra note 48, at 14-
15.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc.,
874 F.2d 20, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that ajury instruction employing "pri-
mary purpose" standard at a minimum was consistent with congressional intent);
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1985) (adopting "one pur-
pose" test and explaining it is consistent with the intent of the legislation). The
primary purpose or one purpose test does not consider whether another legiti-
mate service was rendered. See Greber, 760 F.2d at 72.
1999] 1347
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ferral.52
2. Exemptions Under the Anti-kickback Statute
There are exceptions to the Anti-kickback Statute. Excepted
activities include:
" Disclosed and reflected discounts;53
" Payments to employees;4
* Payments to purchasing agents in certain group pur-
chasing arrangements;
* Waiver of Part B coinsurance for patients qualifying for
56
subsidized services;
" Safe harbors created by regulation;5 ' and
* New exceptions for risk-sharing organizations.58
Congress developed these exceptions and requires the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to issue safe harbors. Accord-
ing to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA"),59 the Secretary must now establish a procedure to
annually solicit recommendations, publish proposals to modify ex-
isting and add new safe harbors under the Anti-kickback Statute.
52. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 15.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (3) (A) (Supp. III 1997).
54. See id. § 1320a-7b(b) (3) (B).
55. See id. § 1320a-7b(b) (3) (C).
56. See id. § 1320a-7b(b) (3) (D).
57. See id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E).
58. See id. § 1320a-7b(b) (3) (F).
59. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d (Supp. III 1997). On July 29, 1991, the OIG is-
sued safe harbors for activities that would not be subject to the Anti-kickback Stat-
ute. These safe harbors include the following activities:
* investment interests;
* space rental;
" equipment rental;
" personal services and management contracts;
" sale of a practice;
* referral services;
* warranties;
" discounts;
" payments to employees;
" group purchasing organizations;
* price reductions offered to health plans;
1348 [Vol. 25
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3. Penalties for Violation of the Anti-kickback Statute
There are severe penalties for violation of the Anti-kickback
Statute. Civil monetary penalties are imposed against a health care
entity that submits a false claim to the government under either the
61Medicare or Medicaid program. Violation of the statute is a fel
ony punishable by not more than five years in prison and/or a fine
" waiver of beneficiary coinsurance/deductible; and
" increased coverage, reduced cost sharing amounts, or reduced pre-
mium amounts offered by health plans.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)-(m) (1994).
Recently, the OIG issued the widely anticipated eight new safe harbors to
the Federal Anti-kickback Statute. These new safe harbors include:
" investments in underserved areas;
" practitioner recruitment in underserved areas
" obstetrical malpractice insurance subsides for underserved areas;
* sales of physician practices to hospitals in underserved areas;
" investments in ambulatory surgical centers;
* investment in group practices;
" referral arrangements for specialty services; and
" cooperative hospital service organizations.
64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999). In addition to establishing these eight new
safe harbors, the final rule also clarifies six of the original eleven safe harbors pub-
lished in 1991, and two new interim final safe harbors implementing the statutory
exception to the Anti-kickback Statute for risk arrangements. See id. This makes a
total of twenty-three regulatory safe harbors.
The two risk-sharing exceptions, which implement the shared risk excep-
tion created by HIPPA, address:
* price reductions offered to eligible managed care organizations; and
" price reductions offered by contractors with substantial financial risk to
managed care organizations.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999); HIPAA § 216 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-Tb(b) (3) (F)). An arrangement for items or services between a Medicare
HMO or Competitive Medical Plan and an individual or entity does not result in
an illegal remuneration if the arrangement is pursuant to a written agreement. See
Colleen M. Faddick, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: New Weapons, New Penalties, and
New Fears for Providers Created by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA), 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 77, 84 (1997) (citing Peter A. Pavarini, Physi-
cian Networks & Other Organization Models for Managed Care Contracting, in NATIONAL
HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, ALIGNING THE NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Mar. 13-15,
1997)). Arrangement for items or services, if in writing, that the individual or en-
tity is obligated to provide are not considered illegal remuneration under the Anti-
kickback Statute. See id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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of $50,000 per act plus three times the remuneration offered. 62
The government can exclude the health care entity from par-
61ticipation in the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs. Under the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the government issued new program
exclusion provisions. One provision is the "Three Strikes and
You're Out" provision.64 This provides mandatory lifetime program
exclusion for any provider convicted of defrauding the Medi-
care/Medicaid program on two or more occasions.6 5 The second
provision is called the "One Strike and You're Out" provision.
66
This establishes a ten year program exclusion for any rovider con-
victed of defrauding the Medicare/Medicaid program.
In addition, under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 6 the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services is authorized to refuse to en-
ter into, renew, or terminate an agreement with a health care pro-
vider convicted of a felony under federal or state law. The provider
must be convicted of an offense which the Secretary determines is
"detrimental to the best interests of the program or program bene-
ficiaries. " 69 Furthermore, civil penalties of $50,000 per act are im-
posed against individuals who contract with an excluded provider.70
B. The Stark Law
The Stark Law evolved through the passage and amendment
of several legislative bills introduced by U.S. Representative Fortney
"Pete" Stark (R-Cal.). 7' The initial Stark law was introduced under
the title of Ethics in Patient Referrals Act ("Stark I").71 It was ini-
62. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 3 (discussing the new civil monetary penalties
for violations of the Anti-kickback law passed under the Balanced Budget Act of
1997). These penalties are effective for arrangements entered into after August 5,
1997. See id.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (7) (Supp. III 1997).
64. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 2.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The provision ap-
plies to judgments of conviction entered on or after August 5, 1997. See id.
66. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 2.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This is applicable to
convictions occurring on or after August 5, 1997. See id.
68. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
69. Eiland, supra note 48, at 2.
70. See id. (discussing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997). This penalty is also
effective for contracts entered on or after August 5, 1997. See id.
71. See Morgan R. Baumgartner, Note, Physician Self-Referral and Joint Ventures
Prohibitions: Necessary Shield Against Abusive Practices or Overregulation, 19 J. CoRP. L.
313, 326 (1994).
72. See Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legiti-
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tially passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989 ("OBRA") P and became effective January 1, 1992.14 The stat-
ute prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to a clini-
cal laboratory in which that physician or a member of that physi-
cian's immediate family has a financial relationship.75 Stark I
further provides that an entity that has a financial relationship with
a physician may not submit or cause to be submitted, a claim for re-
imbursement for services provided pursuant to a prohibited refer-
76ral, unless there is an exception.
In 1993, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act expanded
Stark law.77 This became known as Stark 11.7 The subsequent law
expanded the referral prohibition of Stark I to include other des-
ignated health services. It also broadened the self-referral prohi-
bition to include the Medicaid program.8s Stark II became effective
onJanuary 1, 1995.8
Recently, HCFA proposed rules to enforce Stark I.82 As of the
83date of this article, the proposed rules have not been adopted .
When adopted, these regulations will greatly impact the enforce-
ment of the Stark II. These proposed rules should be considered
when implementing a compliance program and will be discussed
below.
mate Business or Unethical "Entrepreneurialism", 15 AM.J.L. & MED. 61, 79 (1989).
73. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
75. See id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A).
76. See id.
77. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 379. See also Andrew B. Wachler & Phyllis A.
Avery, Final Stark Regulations Implement Self-Referral Prohibitions Impacting Health Care
Providers, 74 MICH. B.J. 1274, 1274 (Dec. 1995).
78. See Wachler & Avery, supra note 77, at 1274.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6)(A)-(K) (1994). Designated health services
are defined in the statute as: clinical laboratory services; occupational therapy serv-
ices; radiation therapy services; parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and
suppliers; prosthetics, orthotics and prosthetic devices; physician therapy services;
radiology services; durable medical equipment; outpatient prescription drugs;
home health care services; and inpatient/outpatient hospital services. See id.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
81. See id.
82. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659 (1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424,
435, 455) (proposed Jan. 9, 1998). Due to the complexity of the proposed rule
and the numerous requests for more time to analyze potential ramifications of
rule, the comment time for the proposed Stark II regulations was extended to May
11, 1998. See id. at 1649.
83. This article will discuss the effects the proposed rules would have on the
enforcement of the Stark II if adopted in their current form.
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1. The Elements of the Stark Law
To establish a Stark violation, the following elements must be
present: (1) a "financial relationship" between a health care entity
and physician; (2) a "referral" by the physician to the entity for
"designated health services" s4 and the submission of a claim for the• 85
services; and 3) the absence of an exception. Unlike the Anti-
kickback Statute, Stark law does not require an intentional act for a
violation to occur.
a. A Financial Relationship
A financial relationship between a health care entity and a
physician can be in the form of an ownership interest, investment
interest, or a compensation arrangement with the health care en-
tity.8 6 An ownership or investment interest may be through equity,
debt, or other means. It also includes an interest in an entity that
holds an ownership or investment interest in another health care
84. The proposed rules may affect several definitions under Stark. The pro-
posed regulations define the designated health services added by Stark II. See 63
Fed. Reg. at 1673. First, when the definition of a designated health service differs
under a state Medicaid plan from the definition under Medicare, HCFA will as-
sume the services under the state plan govern even if the definition includes serv-
ices that are not covered by Medicare. See id. at 1673. Second, the proposed rules
exclude invasive radiology from the designated health service of "radiology serv-
ices." See id. at 1676. The rationale is that such services are incidental, secondary
or "merely peripheral" to another procedure, so that abuse via overutilization is
unlikely. See id. Third, the proposed rules consider the exclusion of surgically im-
planted devices from the definition of prosthetic devices. See id. at 1678-79. HCFA
is concerned about situations in which a physician has a financial interest with a
device manufacturer. See id. at 1678. The physician may choose a device based on
financial reasons rather than considering what is best for the patient. See id. at
1679. Such a physician may be in a position to manipulate the hospital's choice of
prosthetic device. See id. While this may not result in an overutilization of services,
it may increase costs of services that are not subject to a fee schedule. See id. Fi-
nally, the proposed rules define inpatient and outpatient hospital services. See id.
at 1681-84. HCFA borrowed the definition for inpatient hospital services from
Medicare Part A. See id. at 1681. However, HCFA includes lithotripsy under this
definition. See id. at 1682. Although there is little risk of overutilization, abuse
may occur if a physician uses certain equipment because of a financial incentive
rather than considering what is best for the patient. See id. The definition of out-
patient services includes services furnished by a psychiatric hospital and a rural
primary care hospital covered under Medicare Part B. See id. at 1683. The pro-
posed definition includes outpatient hospital services incident to physician serv-
ices, diagnostic outpatient hospital services, and partial hospitalization services.
See id. at 1683-84.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(e) (1994).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2) (A)-(B) (1994).
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87
entity that provides a designated health service.
The regulations proposed by HCFA redefine the phrase "fi-
nancial relationship."m Under the proposed rules, stock options
and nonvested interests constitute an ownership interest.89 Thus, if
stock options are given as part of compensation, then an illegal
ownership interest and a compensation arrangement is created un-
less a Stark law exception applies. 9°
The proposed rules seek to establish two situations in which an
ownership interest is created via debt. First, the rules assert that an
ownership interest is created when the physician 9l loans money or
other valuable consideration to a health care entity and the debt is
secured by the property or assets of the entity.92 Second, the rules
propose an ownership interest in a creditor-debtor relationship
that has an indicia of ownership. An example of this is when the
creditor participates in revenue, profits, or ownership of bonds that
can be converted into the common stock of the issuer.93
Finally, the proposed regulations establish that a financial rela-
tionship exists through an indirect ownership or investment inter-
est, regardless of how many times it is removed from the direct in-
terest. This proposed rule requires a health care entity to identify
financial relationships with physicians and their immediate family
members all the way down the chain of ownership and invest-
ment.9" If this regulation is adopted, it will create an enormous
burden for large managed care companies."
87. See id.
88. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1707 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
455) (proposedJan. 8, 1998).
89. See id. at 1708.
90. See id.
91. See id. This includes the immediate family member of the physician as
well. See id. at 1686, 1708. The proposed rules provide that loans to physicians or
their family members from the entity do not create an ownership interest, but do
create a compensation arrangement. See id. at 1707.
92. See id. at 1707.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1686.
95. See id. at 1703. The definition of an immediate family member includes
in-laws and the spouses of grandchildren. See id. at 1672.
96. See id. at 1703. "A number of entities have pointed out to us that the
amounts of data they are required to report under the statute will, in some cir-
cumstances, be overwhelming." Id.
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b. Compensation Arrangements
A compensation arrangement is defined under Stark II as any
arrangement involving remuneration, direct or indirect, between a
physician and the health care entity. It includes any payment, dis-
count, forgiveness of debt or other benefit made directly or indi-
rectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.97 The proposed rules
do not change this definition, but recognize that payments result-
ing from an ownership or investment interest are not compensa-
tion. For example, dividends or other returns on an investment
would not be considered compensation. 98
c. Referrals
The proposed rules try to clarify what constitutes a referral.
Stark I broadly defined a referral as "the request by a physician for
any item or service for which payment may be made under Medi-
care Part B .... "99 The proposed regulation narrows this by limit-
ing a referral to instances in which a physician requests, orders, cer-
tifies, or recertifies the need for, or establishes a plan of care that
includes, designated health services covered by Medicare Part A or
Part B.l°° The proposed rules recognize that a consultation occurs
when a physician requests that the patient see a specialist, but still
maintains control over the care of the patient. A consultation does
not occur when the specialist takes over the care of the patient. TM
The preamble to the proposed rules sets forth that creating a
plan of care that results in a patient receiving a designated health
service from a health care entity with which a physician has a per-
missible financial relationship.02 This is true as long as the physi-
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h) (1) (A)-(C) (1994). It is also significant to note
that the remuneration does not necessarily have to be paid by an entity to a physi-
cian. A remuneration may also exist even if the physician is making the payment
to the health care entity.
98. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1686-87 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424,
435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
99. Id. at 1663, 1692.
100. See id. at 1692. In the preamble, HCFA establishes that the phrase "service
for which payment may be made under part B" may be interpreted to mean that a
designated health service that would ordinarily be covered, regardless of whether
Medicare pays for the service. Id. at 1710. Thus, sanctions may be levied for sub-
mitting a prohibited claim which does not harm the Medicare program. See id. at
1692, 1694.
101. See id. at 1693.
102. See id. at 1710.
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cian does not control or influence the decision to refer the pa-
tient. If it is unclear who referred a patient and the patient's
physician has a financial relationship with the entity that provided
the designated health care services, then HCFA will presume that
the physician made an illegal referral and may impose sanctions.1°4
2. Exceptions to the Stark Law
The Stark law has a number of exceptions. These exceptions
may be organized into three broad categories: (1) exceptions ap-
plicable to both ownership interests and compensation arrange-
ments; (2) exceptions applicable to ownership interests; and (3)
exceptions applicable to compensation arrangements.
a. Exceptions to Both Ownership Interests and Compensation
Arrangements
i. The Physician Services Exception
Three exceptions apply to both ownership interests and com-
pensation arrangements. The first exception pertains to physician
services. This exception permits physician services °5 and some des-
ignated health services to be performed or directly supervised by
the physician who is not making the referral if the referring physi-
cian is a member of the same group practice.1°6
ii. The In-house Ancillary Service Exception
Another exception pertains to in-house ancillary services. This
exception permits a referral when services are:
(1) provided personally by the referring physician, a
member of his or her group practice, or an individual who
is directly supervisedlo by either the referring physician or
103. See id. at 1711.
104. See id. This presumption may be rebutted with contrary evidence pre-
sented by the physician. See id.
105. The proposed regulations make clear that this exception does not include
"incident to" services. See id. at 1695. Under this exception, personal supervision
is interpreted to mean that the supervising physician is legally responsible for
monitoring the results of the designated health service and is accessible to assist
the non-member physician. See id.
106. See42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1) (1994).
107. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1684 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
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a member of the group practice;
(2) furnished in the building'0s in which the referring
physician or group practice furnishes physicians' services
that are unrelated to the providing of designated health
services;109 and
(3) billed by the physician performing or supervising the
services, the group practice of which the physician is a
member, or an entity that is wholly owned by such physi-S 110
cian or such group practice.
iii. Effect of the Proposed Rules on the Physician Services
and In-house Ancillary Services Exceptions
Both the physician services and in-office ancillary services ex-
ceptions permit referrals among members of the same group prac-
tice. The proposed regulations impact the group practice aspect of
these exceptions.
(a) Definition of Group Practice
Currently, the law defines a group practice as a practice con-
sisting of two or more physicians who have formed a partnership,
separate professional corporation, foundation, not-for-profit cor-
455) (proposed Jan. 9, 1998). The proposed regulations interpret direct supervi-
sion as including "brief unexpected absences as well as... routine absences of a
short duration (such as during a lunch break), provided the absences occur dur-
ing time periods in which the physician is otherwise scheduled and ordinarily ex-
pected to be present. .. ." Id.
108. See id. at 1695. The proposed regulations clarify this requirement by stat-
ing that "the same building" is a single physical structure but does not include a
mobile x-ray unit parked in the building's garage. Id. In addition, the same loca-
tion test may be fulfilled by group practice providing services in a building used
for the "centralized provision" of the group's designated health services. See id. at
1696. This standard is met if it "services more than one of a group's offices and if
it furnishes one or any combination of designated health services." Id. Therefore,
a group practice may have several "centralized" locations, but the direct supervi-
sion test must be satisfied at each location. See id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (1994). This exception does not apply to
durable medical equipment (excluding infusion pumps) or parenteral and en-
teral nutrients, equipment, and supplies. See id. Alternatively, the group may fur-
nish the services in a building that is used to provide either some or all of the
group's clinical laboratory services. See id. The proposed rules also allow group
practices to bill under any assigned number to the group. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659,
1696 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (2) (1994).
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poration, faculty practice plan, or similar association."' Stark I did
not acknowledge a practice as a group practice if it was comprised
of two or more separate legal entities.
The proposed rules also require that a group practice be one
legal entity.1t However, the proposed rules interpret "one legal en-
tity" to include owners who are individual professional corporations
or owned by physicians who are individually incorporated. Thus,
a physician who is a sole member or shareholder of his or her own
entity may contract with the group practice without affecting the
group's status as one legal entity. These physicians also qualify as
members of the group and may supervise services for the group
practice." 7
(b) Independent Contractor Physicians and the "75 %
Requirement"
Under Stark I, independent contractor physicians were con-
sidered members of a group practice. As a result, many group
practices employed independent contractor physicians to perform
and/or supervise designated health services.'[ 9 The rules proposed
by the HCFA, however, modify the definition of group practice to
exclude independent contractor physicians. An independent con-
tractor would not be permitted to directly supervise or render a
designated health service under this proposed definition. 2 °
The proposed rule will make it easier for group practices with
part-time contractors to fulfill the "75% requirement." The 75%
requirement mandates that substantially all (interpreted by the
proposed rules to mean at least seventy-five percent)121 of the pa-
tient care services of group member physicians are furnished and
111. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1687 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. The proposed regulations redefine "members of a group" as physi-
cian partners, other physician owners (including individual professional corpora-
tions), and full-time and part-time physician employees. Id. at 1689. These physi-
cians are members of the group while furnishing patient care services. See id.
117. See id. at 1687.
118. See id. at 1689-90.
119. See id. at 1689.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1688.
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billed through the group.12 Patient care services are measured by
the total patient care time each group member spends on these
services. Thus, if a physician works forty hours per week and thirty
hours are attributable to patient care services, the physician has
spent 75% of his or her time rendering countable patient care serv-
ices. 
21
Stark I defined patient care services as tasks performed by a
group practice member that pertain to the medical need of specific
patients. 24 The proposed rules expand this definition by adding
"tasks that generally benefit a particular practice." 25 This would in-
clude things like staff training, arranging for equipment, and ad-
ministrative or managerial tasks. HCFA is recognizing the fact that
a physician functions as a group member by providing administra-
tive service.1
26
The 75% requirement is key to enforcement of the Stark law.
This standard requires a group practice to annually file an attesta-
tion which demonstrates that the group fulfilled the 75% require-
ment during the most recent twelve month period.127 If a group
practice fails to satisfy this requirement, Medicare payments may be
considered overpayments. 12 The proposed regulations expand this
provision by requiring that the attestation be signed by a knowl-S 129
edgeable group representative. This notifies representatives that
false statements submitted to the Medicare program will be subject
to criminal and civil sanctions.3 0
iv. The Prepaid Health Plan Exception
The final exception applicable to both ownership interests and
compensation arrangements applies when designated health serv-
ices are provided by certain prepaid health plans to enrolled indi-
viduals. This exception is limited because it applies only to health
122. See id. at 1687-88.
123. See id. at 1688-89.
124. See id. at 1687-88.
125. Id.
126. See id. This provision also requires that 75% of the patient care services
be billed under a billing number given to the group. See id. at 1689. The pro-
posed regulations interpret this to allow a group or a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the group to possess more than one billing number. See id. at 1689, 1696.
127. See id. at 1670.
128. See id. at 1671.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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services provided by specific prepaid plans."1 The proposed rules
retain this exception, but interpret it to include services furnished
by the organizations and services furnished to the organization's-• 132
enrollees by contracted physicians, providers, or suppliers. The
extension to outside contractors is helpful because most prepaid
health plans do not actually furnish services, but do contract for
services with outside personnel.1
33
b. Ownership Interests Exceptions
There are five ownership interest exceptions under Stark law.
The first exception states that this law does not apply to ownership
of investment securities that:
(1) may be purchased on terms generally available to the
public;
(2) are publicly traded; and
(3) were issued by a corporation which had a minimum of
$75 million in shareholder equity (or for securities pur-
chased beforeJanuary 1, 1995, with assets exceeding $100
million) on average over the last three fiscal years or at
the end of the most recent fiscal year.135
The proposed regulations modify this exception so that it ap-
plies to investment securities "that, at the time they [were ob-
tamined] could be purchased on the open market .... .,,136 If
adopted, this regulation will greatly impact physician practice man-
agement companies that acquire physician practices for cash and
stock, and then later go public. A physician receiving stock as pay-
ment will not fit within this exception because the stock may not be
publicly traded at the time of sale. As a result, physician practice
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (3) (1994).
132. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1697 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
133. See id. at 1696-97.
134. See id. at 1698. The proposed rules establish similar provisions to Stark I.
The rules clarify this section by establishing that investments be in securities
"which may be purchased on terms generally available to the public." Id. The
proposed regulations will cover only investment securities on the open market. See
id.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c) (1994).
136. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1698.
1999] 1359
21
Ehler-Lejcher: The Expansion of Corporate Compliance: Guidance for Health Care E
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
management companies may not provide designated health serv-
ices based on referrals made by physician investors.
The second ownership interest exception provides an excep-
tion for a physician who owns shares in an investment company.
According to this exception, a physician may own shares in a regu-
lated investment company whose total assets exceeded $75 million
at the end of the company's most recent fiscal year or on average
for the previous three fiscal years.137
The third exception pertains to a physician who has an owner-
ship or investment interest in an entity that provides designated
health services. This exception requires that the entity be located
in a rural area.38 The entity must also render substantially all of its
services in the same rural area."9
The fourth ownership interest exception applies when a physi-
cian makes a referral within a hospital in which he or she holds an
ownership interest. 14  Referrals are permitted if the "physician is
authorized to perform services at the hospital," and the "ownership
or investment interest is in the hospital itself (and not merely in a
subdivision of the hospital)." 141 This is known as the "whole hospi-
tal" exception. 142 According to the proposed rules, this provision
pertains to designated health services that are furnished by a hospi-
tal, and not to services furnished by other health care providers
that are owned by the hospital, such as a home health agency or
skilled nursing facility.
143
Finally, the fifth exception that applies to an ownership inter-
est pertains to hospitals located in Puerto Rico that render desig-
nated health services.' 44 According to this provision, the ownership
interest does not have to be in the entire hospital.
14
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c) (2) (1994).
138. See id. § 1395nn(d) (2).
139. See id.
140. See id. § 1395nn(d)(3).
141. Id.
142. See Deborah W. Larios, Comment, New Stark II Regulations Aim to Clarify
Physician Self-Referrals Rules, ANDREWS HEALTH CARE FRAUD LrrIG. REP., Mar. 1998, at
10.
143. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1698-99 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424,
435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(d)(1) (1994).
145. See ASPEN HEALTH LAW CENTER, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 4:14 (1997).
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c. Compensation Arrangement Exceptions
The Stark law provides five exceptions for physicians who haveS 146
compensation arrangements with a health care entity. Under
these exceptions, a physician must have a compensation arrange-
ment with the facility to which he or she refers patients for desig-
nated health services. Those services must be subject to reim-
bursement under the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs.1
7
i. Rental of Office Space and Equipment
The first exception applies to rental of office space and/or
equipment. Payments made for the rental of office space or
equipment are not prohibited under the Stark law if:
(1) the lease is in writing, signed by the parties, and speci-
fies the leased premises or equipment;
(2) the space or equipment rented does not exceed what
is reasonable or necessary for its legitimate business pur-
pose and it is used exclusively by the lessee;
49
(3) the lease is for at least one year;150
(4) the rent charged is established in advance, consistent
with fair market value, and is not determined in a man-
ner that considers the volume or value of any referral or
other business generated;
152
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e).
147. See id.
148. Id. §§ 1395nn(e) (1) (A) (i), (e) (1) (B) (i).
149. Id. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)(A)(ii), (e)(1)(B)(ii).
150. Id. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)(A)(iii), (e) (1) (B) (iii). The proposed rules seek to
clarify the meaning of several key terms found in the Compensation Arrangement
Exceptions. This provision relates to the one year requirement that is found in
several of the compensation-related exception. The rules clarify that a clause that
allows the parties to terminate the agreement for good cause will not disqualify the
arrangement from satisfying the one-year requirement. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1698 (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998). However,
the parties may not terminate the agreement and enter into a new arrangement
within the initial one year period. See id.
151. Under the proposed rules, the HCFA "defines fair market value as the
value in arm's-length transactions, consistent with the general market value ...."
63 Fed. Reg. at 1686. The HCFA suggests that the bone fide sales price may be
indicative of the general market value. See id. The fair market value of rentals and
leases means the value of rental property for general commercial purposes (not
considering its intended use or proximity to the source of patient referrals). See id.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)(A)(iv), (e)(1)(B)(iv) (1994). The referral
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(5) the lease would be commercially reasonable even if no
referral were made between the parties;15 and
(6) the lease meets any other requirements that may be
imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices.M
A health care entity must meet all these requirements to qual-
ify for this exception. The proposed regulations recognize that this
exception does not apply to a capital lease because such a lease is
more like an installment sale than a rental agreement.
155
ii. Bona Fide Employment Relationships
The second compensation exception to the Stark law pertains
to a bona fide employment relationship. Any payment "by an em-
ployer to a physician (or an immediate family member of such phy-
sician) who has a bona fide employment relationship with the em-
ployer" does not create a prohibited "financial relationship."'56 In
order to fit within this exception, the following conditions must be
met:
(A) the employment is for identifiable services;
(B) the amount of remuneration under the employment
is:
(i) consistent with the fair market value' 5' of the serv-
ices; and
(ii) is not determined in a manner that takes into ac-
count the volume or value of any referrals;
58
(C) the remuneration provided pursuant to an agreement
must be for designated health services. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 1700. The proposed
rules explain that a compensation arrangement may fail to meet this standard
even when a physician's payments from an entity are always the same. See id. For
example, if a hospital requires a physician to refer only within network, then that
physician's compensation would reflect the volume or value of the referrals. See id.
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e) (1) (A) (v), (e) (1) (B) (v) (1994). This commercial
reasonableness standard is found in several provisions of the compensation-related
exceptions. The proposed rules interpret commercial reasonableness as an ar-
rangement that seems to be a "sensible, prudent business agreement, from the
perspective of the particular parties involved, even in the absence of any potential
referrals." 63 Fed. Reg. at 1700.
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)(A)(vi), (e) (1) (B) (vi) (1994).
155. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 1714.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (2) (1994).
157. See supra note 151 (defining fair market value).
158. See supra note 152 (defining volume or value of referrals).
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would be commercially reasonable 5 9 even if no referrals
were made to the employer; and
(D) the employment meets any other requirements that
may be imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.'60
According to Stark II, a person is an employee if the individual
satisfies the definition of an employee under the usual common law
rule as required by section 3121(d) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code. This definition is favorable because it presumes that an
individual who works full-time in the facility of another is the em-
ployee of that facility, unless the individual can prove otherwise.1
62
Under the bona fide employment relationship exception, the
proposed regulations specifically limit productivity bonuses. Pro-
ductivity bonuses may be paid based on services personally per-
formed by the physician. Under this compensation exception, a
physician may receive payment for designated health services that
the physician referred to himself.164 The proposed rule attempts to
remedy this by allowing "group practices to pay members a produc-
tivity bonus only if the bonus is not directly related to the volume
or value of the physician's own referrals."' 65
iii. Personal Service Arrangements
If a physician receives payment pursuant to a personal service
arrangement, it may fit within an exception under the Stark law.
Such payment will not be considered remuneration if the following
elements are satisfied:
(i) the arrangement is in writing, signed by the parties;
159. See supra note 153 (defining commercially reasonable).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (2) (1994).
161. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (1998).
162. See DOUCLAS M. MANCINO, NAVIGATING YOUR WAY THROUGH THE FEDERAL
PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL LAw 67 (1995).
163. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1700 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 1700-01. This employee exception under the proposed rule differs
from the group practice exception. The group practice definition permits bo-
nuses based on services personally performed furnished and incident to physicians
services. See id. at 1701. The group practice exception also permits profit sharing
among group members as long as a physician's share is not based on referrals. See
id.
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(ii) the arrangement covers all of the services to be pro-
vided by the physician to the entity;
(iii) the aggregate services contracted for do not exceed
those that are reasonable and necessary for the legitimate
business purposes of the arrangement;
(iv) the arrangement is for at least one year;167
(v) the compensation to be paid is set in advance and
does not exceed fair market value,1 '8 and except in the
case of a physician incentive plan is not determined in a
manner that takes into account the volume or value of any
referrals' 69 or other business generated between the par-
ties;
(vi) the services to be performed under the arrangement
do not involve the counseling or promotion or a business
arrangement or other activity that violates any State or
Federal law; and
(vii) the arrangement meets such other requirements as
may be imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
170
This exception is designed to protect arrangements in which
providers of designated health services obtain "personal services"
from independent contractor physicians who are not employees,"'
Arrangements that involve any service that a physician may render,
including administrative service and patient care services, are per-
mitted if the requirements of this exception are satisfied.
In the proposed rules, HCFA recognizes that it may not be
logical for all physician personal service contracts to be contained
in one agreement. Thus, the proposed rules allow multiple con-
tracts.172 Each contract must meet all of the requirements of the
exception, and incorporate each other by reference.
166. See supra note 153 (defining commercially reasonable).
167. See supra note 150 (discussing the one-year requirement).
168. See supra note 151 (defining fair market value).
169. See supra note 152 (discussing volume or value of referrals).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (3) (A) (1994).
171. SeeMANCINO, supra note 162, at 59.
172. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1701 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435,
455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
173. See id.
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iv. Physician Incentive Plan
One would think that a physician incentive plan.74 would be
prohibited under the Stark laws. Surprisingly, this is not the case.
Payments made pursuant to a physician incentive plan may take
into account the volume or value of referrals in some circum-
stances. 75  This is achieved by withholding, capitation, or bo-176
nuses. A physician incentive plan is permissible if:
(1) no payment is made to induce the reducing or limit-
ing of medically necessary services to individuals who are
enrolled with the entity;
(2) the plan places the physician or a physician group in
some sort of financial risk as determined by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, the plan must meet any
additional requirements that may be imposed by the Sec-
retary; and
(3) the entity provides the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services with access to any requested information
about the plan.177
v. Physician Recruitment
The final exception pertains to physician recruitment. Remu-
neration may be given to induce a physician to relocate to the geo-
graphic area served by a hospital.179 A compensation arrange-
ment for recruitment is permitted if. (1) the physician is not
required to refer patients to the hospital; (2) the remuneration to
be paid does not consider referrals; and (3) the arrangement meets
any other requirements that might be imposed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.180  If a hospital makes recruitment
174. Physician incentive plan is defined by the exception to the Stark law as
"any compensation arrangement between an entity and a physician or physician
group that may directly or indirectly have the effect of reducing or limiting serv-
ices provided with respect to individuals enrolled with the entity." 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn(e) (3) (B) (ii) (1994).
175. See42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(3)(B)(i).
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. The proposed rules are specifically soliciting comments on how to define
geographic area. 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1702 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411,
424, 435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
179. See42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(5).
180. See id.
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payments to a physician within the hospital's geographic area, or to
a group practice that intends to employ the relocating physician
and contract with the hospital, then payments may fit within the
compensation arrangement 
exception.y t 
f
vi. New Compensation Arrangement Exceptions
The proposed regulations issued by HCFA create several new
compensation arrangement exceptions.
18
1
(a) The Fair Market Value Exception
The Fair Market Value Exception would protect arrangements
between a physician, or group of physicians, and a health care en-
tity if the arrangement satisfies the following conditions:
(1) the arrangement is in writing, signed by all the parties,
and covers only identifiable items or services specified in
the agreement. The arrangement must also cover all of
the items and services that will be provided by the physi-
cian or immediate family member to the entity or, cross-
reference any other agreements for items or services be-
tween any of the parties;
(2) the arrangement must set forth a time frame for any
period of time and contain a termination clause, provided
the parties enter into only one arrangement covering the
same items or services during the course of a year. If the
arrangement is for less than one year, it may be renewed
any number of times if the terms of the arrangement and
the compensation for the same items or services do not
change;
(3) the arrangement must specify the compensation that
will be provided under the arrangement. The method for
determining the compensation must be established in ad-
vance. Compensation must be consistent with fair market
value, and may not be determined in a manner that takes
into account the volume or value of any referrals; payment
for referral of medical services that are not covered under
Medicare or Medicaid; or other business generated be-
tween the parties; and
181. See63 Fed. Reg. at 1702.
182. See id. at 1699.
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(4) the arrangement must involve a transaction that is
commercially reasonable and furthers the legitimate busi-
ness purposes of the parties and must satisfy the condi-
tions of a safe harbor under the anti-kickback statute or
otherwise be in compliance with the Medicare/Medicaid
anti-kickback provisions.181
This proposed regulation acts as a catch-all to cover the more
common compensation arrangements that are based on fair mar-
ket value or are otherwise commercially reasonable, and does not
reflect the volume or value of a physician's referral . 8 This excep-
tion is used if there is doubt about whether the arrangement meets
the requirements under another Stark II exception. 5
(b) Discounts
The proposed regulations also provide a compensation ar-. .. .. 186
rangement exception relating to discounts. Any discount given
to a physician must be passed on in full to either the patient or the
patient's insurers and may not inure to the benefit of the referring
physician. 8 The discount is exempt if it meets the following re-quirements:
(1) the discount is offered to all similarly situated indi-
viduals, regardless of whether they make referrals to the
entity;
(2) it doesn't reflect the volume or value of referrals the
physician has made or will make to the entity; and
(3) the discount is passed on to Medicare or other insur-
188ers.
The proposed regulation establishes that when a physician fails
to pass on a discount to a patient, Stark II is violated. For example,
sanctions may be imposed if a physician receives a discount from a
drug manufacturer on a drug and fails to pass that discount to the
Medicare program and to patients. The proposed rule assumes
183. Id. at 1699.
184. See id. at 1699.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1694.
187. See id.
188. Id.
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that drug manufacturers and medical product suppliers furnish
designated health services as defined by Stark. 189
(c) The De Minimis Exception
The proposed rules provide an exception for compensation
arrangements that involve de minimis remuneration. 19° HCFA rec-
ognizes that physicians or their immediate family members acquire
compensation in the form of incidental benefits that are not part of
a formal, written agreement. 191 This includes items like free drug
samples; staff training sessions prior to entering into a contract with
a facility that provides designated health services; training sessions
that are not considered part of the agreement; coffee mugs; or
note pads.1
92
The proposed exception applies to compensation from an en-
tity in the form of items or services, other than cash or cash equiva-
lents, that do not exceed $50 per payment and an aggregate of
$300 per year."" The following must be satisfied:
(a) the entity providing the compensation makes it avail-
able to all similarly situated individuals, regardless of
whether these individuals refer patients to the entity for
services; and
(b) the compensation is not determined in a way that
takes into account the volume or value of the physician's
referrals to the entity;194 and
(c) the arrangement meets other requirements as may be
imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
as needed to protect against program or patient abuse.
1 95
The proposed exception applies only to noncash items or serv-
ices and would not apply to gift certificates, stocks or bonds, or dis-
counted airline frequent flier miles.1
9
6
Free parking has been debated as de minimis remuneration in
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1699.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1700.
196. See id. at 1699.
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some parts of the country."" The proposed rules clarify that while a
physician is making rounds, free parking benefits both the hospital
and its patients and is not a personal benefit to the physician.
198
Thus, free parking in this case would not constitute a compensa-
tion arrangement. However, if a hospital does provide parking to
physicians at times, which do not coincide with the physician's
rounds, sanctions may be imposed for a Stark violation.
(d) Other Exceptions
Finally, Stark law provides for other situations that do not qual-
ify under the enumerated ownership interest or compensation ar-
rangement exceptions. These other exceptions address isolated
transactions and group practice arrangements in which the hospital
bills for services rendered. The proposed rules do not affect these
exceptions.
(1) Isolated Transaction Exception
This exception considers payments received by a physician in
an isolated transaction, such as a one time sale of a medical prac-
tice. An isolated transaction is an acceptable compensation ar-rangement under the Stark laws if:
(1) the remuneration involved in the transaction is in ac-
cordance with the fair market value of the services, and
does not take into account the volume or value of refer-
rals made to the entity by the physician;
(2) the remuneration provided pursuant to an agreement
is commercially reasonable even if no referrals were made
between the parties; and
(3) the transaction meets any other requirements that
may be imposed by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. p20 '
In addition, there can be no transactions between the physi-
cian and provider of designated health services for six months after
197. See id. at 1713-14.
198. See id. at 1714.
199. See id.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (6) (1994).
201. See id. § 1395nn(e)(2).
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the isolated transaction, unless specifically excepted under other
Stark provisions.Y
(2) Group Practice Exception
The Stark law also provides an exception for group practice ar-
rangements between a hospital and a group practice. The excep-
tion applies if the group provides designated health services, but
204the services are billed by the hospital. This is permitted if the fol-lowing requirements are satisfied:
(1) the arrangement is in compliance with the provision
of inpatient hospital services;
(2) the arrangement began prior to December 19, 1989,
and has continued without interruption since that day;
205
(3) under the arrangement, the group furnishes substan-
tially all of the designated health services to patients of the
hospital;
(4) the arrangement is written and specifies the services
covered;
(5) the compensation is fixed in advance and is consistent
with fair market value;
206
202. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.357 (1997). For example, upon the purchase of a phy-
sician's practice, installment payments for that purchase would create significant
exposure to liability under Stark laws. In the preamble to the Stark I proposed
regulations, concerns were raised about installment payment arrangement. See
MANCINO, supra note 162, at 64. The Department of Health and Human Services
stated that installment payment arrangement would not qualify for the isolated
transaction exception and that the former owners would be prohibited from refer-
ring patients to the entity until all the payments were made. See id. It may be as-
serted that it is a contractual right to receive a deferred payment and the payment
is considered an investment in that entity. See id. at 13. Furthermore, this provi-
sion may be circumvented by either making the payments within a time frame of
six months or by placing the amount paid in a trust. A trust would permit the trust
to make the payment of both the principal and the interest and, arguably, would
remove the possibility of the intention to induce a prohibited referral.
203. See42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (7) (1994).
204. See id.
205. See id. § 1395nn(e) (7) (A). The proposed rules recognize that this re-
quirement is still satisfied even if the contract between the parties has changed so
that it covers different services, or the services are provided by different individuals
within the same group practice. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1702 (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435, 455) (proposedJan. 9, 1998).
206. See supra note 151 (defining fair market value).
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(6) the arrangement is commercially reasonably;2°7 and
(7) the arrangement meets any other requirements that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services may im-208
pose.
The Stark law truly is a law of exceptions. There are many ex-
ceptions and proposed exceptions to physician self-referrals. Physi-
cians and entities providing designated health services who create
ownership interests or compensation relationships should review
the manner in which profits are shared, and compensation is paid,
to determine if these relationships comply with Stark law. The dif-
ficulty of the Stark law is in understanding its intent and excep-
tions. Failure to comprehend the intricacies of Stark law when es-
tablishing a corporate compliance program may result in
substantial penalties.
3. Penalties for Violating the Stark Law
The penalties under the Stark law are significant. First, if a vio-
lation is found, payment for the provided service may be denied.209
Second, the government may require repayment of the claims
billed in violation of the law. Third, any person who presents or
causes to be presented a bill or claim for services that the individual
knows or should know is for a service for which payment may not
be made, or for which a refund has not been made, shall be subject
to a civil money penalty of not more than $15,000 for each serv-
ice.21 Fourth, any physician or health care entity that enters into
an arrangement or scheme that the physician or entity knows or
should know has the principal purpose of circumventing the law, is
subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $100,000 for each
arrangement or scheme; and/or exclusion from the Medicare and
212Medicaid programs. Finally, any person who is subject to, but
fails to meet, a reporting requirement may be assessed a civil
money penal7 of not more than $10,000 for each day the reporting
was required. 13
207. See supra note 153 (discussing commercial reasonableness).
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e) (7) (A) (vii) (1994).
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g) (1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
210. See id. § 1395nn(g) (2).
211. See id. § 1395nn(g) (3).
212. Seeid. § 1395nn(g) (4).
213. Seeid. § 1395nn(g) (5).
1999l
33
Ehler-Lejcher: The Expansion of Corporate Compliance: Guidance for Health Care E
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
C. The False Claims Act
1. The Law
The False Claims Act ("FCA) 2 14 was originally enacted in 1863
to rid the defense industry of fraud.215 The FCA resurfaced in 1986
to combat all forms of government procurement and contracting
fraud, including fraud in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Currently, the FCA requires those who do business with the federal
government to deal with the government in an honest fashion. It
imposes liability on persons or health care entities who:
(1) knowingly present or cause to be presented a false or
fraudulent claim for payment to the United States; 17
(2) knowingly use a false record or statement to obtain
payment on a false or fraudulent claim paid by the United
States; 21s or
(3) engage in a conspiracy to defraud the United States to
obtain allowance for payment of a false or fraudulent
claim.
219
The term "knowingly" means having actual knowledge, or act-
ing with deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the informa-
tion, or acting with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the
information. 2  Specific intent is not required by the FCA. The
intent behind the FCA was to stop "ostrich head in the sand" behav-
ior that happens when a person fails to make any inquiry for fear
that it would reveal the false claim.2
214. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
215. Howard M. Pearl et al., The False Claims Act and the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-
Kickback Statute: An Imperfect Match, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, at B-29 (1995) (citing
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958)); John R. Philips, Qui Tam
Litigation, 14J. LEGAL MED. 267, 268 n.2 (1993); Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 67, at
696-699).
216. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
217. Id. § 3729(a)(1).
218. Id. § 3729(a) (2).
219. Id. § 3729(a) (3).
220. See id. § 3729(b)(1)-(3).
221. See id. § 3729(b).
222. See H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 21 (1986). See also United States v. Entin, 750
F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing False Claims Reform Act of 1985, S. Rep.
No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266). Discussing the
bill's scienter standard on the House floor, the House's chief sponsor of the legis-
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2. Violations of the False Claims Act
Violations of the FCA can result in the assessment of civil
monetary penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 for each false claim filed,
plus treble damages."' The government does not have to prove ac-
224tual damages to recover under the FCA . The government must
only prove that the defendant health care entity acted with "delib-
erate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the truth or falsity of the
information.225 It appears that the only real defenses to an FCA
claim are negligence and inadvertent mistake that the claims
226against the government were false.. s
The court may reduce the penalties This reduction is per-
mitted if: (1) full disclosure of all known information is made
within thirty days after the defendant obtains the information; (2)
the entity fully cooperates with the government investigation; (3)
and no action had commenced under the FCA and the defendant
had no actual knowledge of the existence of a government investi-
gation of such violation when the information was given. 8
Finally, the FCA has a six-year statute of limitations. How-
ever, this time may be tallied three years from the point at which
the government or qui tam relator knew, or reasonably should have
230known, of the alleged fraud.
lation, Rep. Howard L. Berman (Cal.), asserted that the FCA should be viewed as
imposing an "affirmative obligation" on individuals to ascertain the truthfulness of
their claims. 132 CONG. REc. H6474-88 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986).
223. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994); see also United States v. Krizek, 859 F.
Supp. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 1994).
224. See John C. West, The False Claims Act: Potential Liability for Health Providers
for Fraud and Abuse and Beyond, 28J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 15, 16 (1995) (citing Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); see also United States v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537 (1943); United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
225. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)-(3) (1994); see also United States v. Oakwood
Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302, 305-06 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
226. See United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929
F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
227. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
228. See id.
229. See id. § 3731(b)(1).
230. See id. § 3731(b) (2); see also United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp.,
91 F.3d 1211, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1996).
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3. Qui Tam Actions
A qui tam suit is an action under the FCA that is brought on
behalf of the federal government by a private individual, known as
a "qui tam plaintiff," "relator," or "whiste-blower. , 31 These indi-
viduals may be past or current hospital employees, patients, or any-
one who knows that an organization or individual has committed
fraud.
Filing a qui tam complaint is the first step. The only require-
ments for bringing a qui tam action are that the qui tam relator is
the original source of the false claim information, and that the in-
dividual has direct and independent knowledge of the information
232that is the basis for the allegations. The qui tam complaint must
be filed in camera, and is automatically sealed for sixty days, pend-
233ing a government investigation and a decision to intervene.
Government involvement with the action will affect the
amount of recovery for the qui tam relator. A qui tam relator may
receive a percentage of the government's recovery, twenty-five to
thirty percent if the government does not intervene in the action or
234fifteen to twenty-five percent if the government does intervene.
Given the potential for large recoveries, a qui tam relator may earn
a substantial amount of money. However, if the information was
not a substantial contribution to the case, then the qui tam relator
235may only receive a maximum of ten percent of the recovery. In
addition, the qui tam relator may recover reasonable attorney fees
236and costs. If the qui tam relator is criminally convicted for activ-
ity that gave rise to the FCA violation, then the qui tam relator is
dismissed from the civil action and is not entitled to receive any
231share of the recovery.
231. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990). "Qui tam" is short for
"qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which trans-
lates as "he who brings the action for the king as well as for himself." David J.
Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Firepower is Aimed at Health Care
Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127, 127 n.2 (1995) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW Or ENGLAND, BOOK III 160 (1768)).
232. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) (B) (1994).
233. See id. § 3730(b) (2). Among other extensions, the government may chose
to extend the 60-day period to investigate the matter if good cause is found. See id.
§ 3730 (b)(4).
234. See id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
235. Seeid. § 3730(d)(1).
236. See id. § 3730(d)(l)-(2).
237. Seeid. § 3730(d)(3).
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Qui tam actions have been extremely successful. In 1987, only
238
$200,000 was recovered by qui tam actions. In 1994, the govern-
ment recovered $1.09 billion from civil fraud cases, with $411 mil-
239
lion attributable to health care providers. Of the $1.09 billion,
$378 million was obtained via qui tam litigation. 4° Qui tam relators
in these cases received a total of $70 million.24' Qui tam litigation
has become such a lucrative area that some private law firms solicit• 242
qui tam relators via web sites on the Internet. In addition, the
DHHS-OIG has a whistle-blower web site on the Internet as well as
243
an e-mail address for reporting fraud and abuse.
Since the potential for qui tam actions is so significant, a
health care entity must consider them when structuring its corpo-
rate compliance program. The compliance program should be
structured in a way that encourages employees to report violations
to the organization rather than immediately seeking to bring a qui
tam action with the hopes of obtaining personal wealth.
D. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA ")
Recently, the federal government increased the tools available
for investigating and prosecuting instances of health care fraud and
abuse when it adopted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") .244 HIPAA establishes four new
programs to assist in eradicating health care fraud and abuse which
include: Fraud and Abuse Control Program,245 Medical Integrityp 24624
Program, Beneficiary Incentive Program,' 4' Fraud and Abuse
238. See West, supra note 224, at 16 (citing Government Recovers $800 Million
Through Whistleblower Litigation, 5 Medicare Rep. (BNA), at 1291-92 (Nov. 18,
1994)).
239. SeeJosh Chetwynd, Recoveries by US. from Civil Fraud Surged in Fiscal '94,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 12, 1994, at B16.
240. See West, supra note 224, at 16.
241. DAVI D. QUEEN & ELIZABETH E. FRASHER, DESIGNING A HEALTH CARE
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 25 (1995).
242. See Eiland, supra note 48 at 26.
243. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspec-
tor General (visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oei/hotline/
hhshot.html>. The e-mail address is: HTips@os.dhhs.gov. See id.
244. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). President Clinton signed this
bill into law on August 21, 1996.
245. See id. § 201.
246. See id. § 1983.
247. See id. § 203(a).
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Data Collection Program.
First, the Fraud and Abuse Control Program coordinates fed-
eral, state, and local health care anti-fraud enforcement pro-249
grams. This program is jointly administered by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting
through the OIG.2 50 The Administration awarded $2.25 million in
grants to nine state agencies and the District of Columbia, the De-
partment of Defense, and the IRS to cover costs of audits, prosecut-
ing, and consumer education.2 51 Fifteen grants valued at $750,000
were awarded by the HHS Administration on Aging to expand Op-
252eration Restore Trust in twelve new states.
Next, the Medicare Integrity Program authorizes HCFA to
contract with private companies to conduct fraud and abuse detec-
tion, cost report audits, utilization review, provider payment de-
terminations, provider education, and the development of a list of
durable medical equipment ("DME") subject to prior Health and
253Human Services payment authorization. This program is admin-
istered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and funded
254
by money appropriated from the Medicare Part A Trust fund.
The Beneficiary Incentive Program is another program estab-
lished by HIPAA. This program enlists Medicare beneficiaries and
others to assist in identifying health care fraud and abuse. Whistle-
blowers may be paid a portion of the fines collected by the DOJ or
HHS if the information given leads to the recovery of at least $100
f25by the federal government. The process requires the Secretary of
248. See id. § 203(b).
249. See id. § 201(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c).
250. On January 24, 1997, HHS released guidelines explaining the program
and its goals. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FRAUD &
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM AS MANDATED BY THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILrIY AND
ACcOUNTABILiTyAcT OF 1996 (1997).
251. See id.
252. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 4. This program is funded by the Medicare
Hospital Insurance Part A Trust Fund. Fines, penalties and other fraud and abuse
recoveries will also contribute to funding. Appropriations for the first fiscal year of
1997 may not exceed $104 million and may be increased by 15% for each year
thereafter through fiscal year 2003. See HIPAA § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1994
& Supp. III 1997).
253. SeeHIPAA § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd.
254. See id. § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c and § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. 1395i. The
program will be generously funded receiving in 1997 between $430 million and
$440 million and increasing up to the amount of $720 million for each year after
2002. See id.
255. See id. § 203(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5.
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Health and Human Services to: (1) provide an explanation of
benefits to Medicare beneficiaries for each item or service that is
covered under the program;156 (2) establish new programs to en-
courage individuals to report suspected incidents of Medicare
fraud and abuse;257 and (3) solicit feedback from beneficiaries on
2,58ways to improve the program.
Finally, HIPAA requires the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to establish the Fraud and Abuse Data Collection Pro-
gram9. This program operates in coordination with the National
Practitioner Data Bank. It provides for a monthly reporting of
final adverse actions262 taken against a health care practitioner, pro-
vider, or sup?lier by federal and state government agencies and
health plans. A description of the acts or omissions and injuries
upon which final adverse action is based must accompany the re-264
port. The description must also include whether or not the ac-
265tion is on appeal. Malpractice claims and settlements where no
266liability was found do not have to be reported.
Federal and state government agencies, as well as health plans,
267
may obtain information from the database for a reasonable fee.
Providers, suppliers, and licensed practitioners may get a report on
themselves and may dispute the accuracy of the information in the
256. See id. § 203(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5.
257. See id. § 203(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5.
258. See id. § 203(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-5.
259. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 4-5.
260. See id.
261. SeeHIPPA § 221(b) (4).
262. HIPAA defines a final adverse actions as the following:
(1) civil judgments;
(2) federal or state criminal convictions;
(3) revocation or suspension of licensure;
(4) reprimand, censure, or probation;
(5) exclusion from participation in any federal or state health program;
(6) any other negative action or finding by such federal or state agency
that is publicly available; and
(7) any other adjudicated decisions that HHS identifies by regulation.
HIPAA § 221 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(g) (1) (A) (i)-(v).
263. Seeid.§221(b)(1).
264. See id. § 221 (b) (2) (D).
265. See id. § 221 (b) (2) (C).
266. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 5.
267. See HIPAA § 221(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7e(d) (Supp. III 1997).
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report.2 68 Health and Human Services has been authorized to de-
velop procedures to deal with disputes and corrections of the re-
ports. Civil liability occurs if a person or entity knowingly submit-
ted false information.
269
The enactment of HIPAA demonstrates that health care fraud
and abuse remains a high priority for the federal government. The
cost to fight health care fraud and abuse under these new programs
is substantial. The budget for health care fraud fighting programs
is expected to reach $310 million by the year 2002, and then pla-
teau without a sunset provision. 27 Settlements, criminal fines, civil
monetary penalties, and other penalties or damages recovered
from individuals and entities involved in health care fraud and
271
abuse will also support these programs.
IV. REASONS FOR STRUCTURING A CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM: THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Corporate compliance "efforts are designed to establish a cul-
ture within a hospital that promotes prevention, detection and
resolution of instances of conduct that do not conform to federal
and state law, and federal, state and private payor health care pro-
gram requirements, as well as the hospital's ethical and businessS. ,272
policies. The DHHS-OIG developed compliance program guid-
ance for hospitals to assist hospitals and their agents and sub-
providers in developing effective internal controls and infrastruc-
ture as well as to advance the prevention of fraud, abuse, and waste.
Most importantly, these guidelines further the mission of hospitals,
273which is to provide patients quality health care.
A. Advantages of a Corporate Compliance Program
1. Identify and Prevent Criminal and Unethical Conduct
The primary goal of a corporate compliance program is to
prevent violations of the law. Thus, a compliance program must
268. Seeid. § 221 (c) (1)(A).
269. See id. § 1320(a)-7e(e).
270. See HIPPA § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k) (Supp III 1997); 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7c (Supp. III 1997).
271. See id. § 201(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k).
272. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 1.
273. See id. at 2.
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determine areas of the health care entity that pose potential legal
274risks. A compliance program develops procedures that permit
"the prompt, thorough investigation of alleged misconduct by cor-
porate officers, managers, employees, independent contractors,
physicians, [and] other health care professionals and consult-
ants. 7Compliance programs benefit a corporation by providing
a more accurate view of employee and contractor behavior.1
6
If a health care entity has any effective corporate compliance
program, it will learn about wrongful conduct before criminal
charges are brought. The health care entity may modify the behav-
ior of the employee and reduce the potential for liability.277 Early
detection may prevent qui tam or other whistleblower suits and
permit an entity to decide whether to voluntarily disclose the mis-
278conduct to the government.
2. Decrease Exposure to Civil Damages and Penalties, Criminal
Sanctions, Administrative Remedies and Reduce Legal Costs
According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, if an effective
corporate compliance program has been implemented, then the.. . . .279
fine imposed for the criminal violation may be reduced. The fine
274. See Gardner Davis & Jeff McFarland, Corporate Compliance Programs: Protect-
ing the Business From the Rogue Employee, 70 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (Jan. 1996).
275. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 3.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 3-4. The compliance program guidelines for hospitals list as a
benefit of a compliance program the ability to initiate immediate and appropriate
corrective action; and early detection and reporting to minimize the loss to the
government from false claims which would reduce a hospital's exposure to civil
damages and penalties, criminal sanctions, and administrative remedies, such as
program exclusion. See id.
278. See Dan K. Webb & Steven F. Molo, Some Practical Considerations in Develop-
ing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meeting the Requirements of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 375, 377 (1993).
279. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). The OIG will consider the existence of an
effective compliance plan that pre-dated any governmental investigation when de-
termining administrative penalties. See id. Additionally, the False Claim Act, 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, provides that a person in violation of the Act, who discloses
the violation will, in some situations, be subject to not less than double, as opposed
to treble damages. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, § 8C2.5(f) (1994) ("U.S.S.G."). If an effective corporate compliance
program is in place, the Sentencing Guidelines reduce a convicted organization's
"culpability score" by three points. See id. This deduction may reduce the fine
range by as much as 80%, which could save a corporation millions of dollars. See
DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION: AVOIDING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY § 16.0312] [a] (1993). This reduction is not available, however, if a "high
level individual" or an "individual responsible for administration or enforcement"
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will be reduced if two conditions are met: (1) the compliance pro-
gram must be implemented prior to the violation; and (2) the
compliance program must contain all necessary elements.
280
A corporate compliance program may reduce legal costs by
encouraging employees to report potential problems. A compli-
ance program may detect litigation risks before they develop into a
cause of action. It may also improve the speed and quality of re-
sponses to lawsuits, investigations, and other emergencies that may
arise.
Government prosecutors have substantial discretion in decid-
ing whether to indict a health care entity based on the unlawful
282conduct of its employees. The main factor prosecutors consider
when determining whether to bring an indictment is whether the
corporation acted to avoid the criminal conduct.28s Prosecutors of-
ten determine this by analyzing the quality of the compliance pro-284
gram. The government may not prosecute if the corporation
made a good faith effort to avoid wrongful conduct or the problem
285is properly resolved. If litigation occurs, penalties may be signifi-
cantly reduced if the entity has an effective corporate compliance
286program in place.
of the corporate compliance program participated, condoned or remain willfully
ignorant of the unlawful conduct. Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 379.
280. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f); U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k).
281. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 3-4.
282. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 377.
283. See id. at 378.
284. See id. at 377-78 (citing DAN IC WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS: AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 16.03 [2] [a] (1993)).
285. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278; see also Davis & McFarland, supra note
274, at 70 (citing Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrick, Corporate Compliance Programs as
a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RuTGERS L. REV.
605, 666-67 (1995)).
286. According to the U.S.S.G., if a corporation is convicted, the penalty is im-
posed by multiplying a "base fine" by a multiplier. Note, Growing the Carrot: En-
couraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1783, 1785 (1996). This
multiplier is determined by a "culpability score." Id. The base fine is set at the
largest of either the standard fine for that specific violation, the financial gain to
the offender, or the financial harm caused by the violation. See id. Each entity be-
gins with a culpability score of five. See id. Judges may add points to the culpability
score for aggravating factors, such as the involvement in the unlawful activity by
upper-management; if the crime is a repeat offense or a violation of probation or a
judicial order; or the organization is uncooperative during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing. See id. Judges may also subtract points from the cul-
pability score if mitigating factors exist. See id. at 1785-86. Mitigating factors in-
clude the existence of an "effective" compliance program; the corporation admit-
ting responsibility for the unlawful conduct; cooperation of an entity during the
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In addition, the creation and operation of a corporate compli-
ance program is tax deductible. Legal costs are generally reim-
bursable as part of a Medicare cost report.2 87 Penalties imposed
against a health care entity without a corporate compliance pro-
gram are not reimbursable or tax deductible.
3. A Corporate Public Relations and Employee Morale Tool
A corporate compliance program may improve employee mo-
rale, as well as the public image of the health care entity. Imple-
mentation of a corporate compliance program demonstrates to
employees, and the community, that the hospital has a strong
commitment to honest and responsible corporate conduct.28 The
health care entity should convey the corporate attitude that com-
pliance with the law is important by demanding ethical conduct
from all its employees. The public image of a health care entity
may be enhanced if it seeks to uphold ethical business practices.
289
investigation and; voluntary disclosure of the offense. See id. at 1786. Further-
more, if a health care entity with fifty or more employees does not have an effec-
tive compliance program, the organization is placed on probation until one is im-
plemented. See id. Also, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines identify four factors that
determine whether the entity's corporate compliance program is appropriate in its
scope. First, the size of the corporation dictates the degree of formality required
for the compliance program to be effective. See U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, application note
7(i) (1994). Second, the Sentencing Guidelines consider the nature of the busi-
ness of the corporation. If the organization's business exposes it to a "substantial
risk that certain types of offenses will occur, management must [take] steps to pre-
vent and detect those types of offenses." Id. § 8A1.2, application note 7(ii). Next,
the corporate compliance history of the organization will determine if its compli-
ance program is effective. See id. § 8A1.2, application note 7(iii). Finally, the
scope of the compliance program is appropriate if the compliance program is
similar to what other corporations in the industry have adopted. See id. § 8A1.2,
application note 3(k).
287. David D. Queen, Corporate Compliance Programs, An Overview, Presen-
tation at the Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys Fifteenth Annual Health
Law Symposium (Oct. 17, 1997). The current HCFA reimbursement process per-
mits some of the costs associated with the creation of a voluntarily established
compliance program may be allowable costs on certain types of hospitals' cost re-
ports. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 7 n.7 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1395x(v) (1) (A) (defining reasonable cost); 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.9(a), (b)(2) (costs
related to patient care)). These costs must be reasonable and related to patient
care. See id. However, costs from the implementation of a corporate compliance
program imposed by the government as a result of a civil or criminal judgment or
settlement are not reimbursable. See id.
288. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 3.
289. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 34 (citing Lynn Sharp Paine,
Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARv. Bus. REv. 106, 111 (Mar./Apr.
1994)).
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The corporate compliance program may bolster morale. A
positive corporate attitude can remedy problems associated with
employee misconduct. Misconduct can cause poor employee pro-
ductivity and disrupt business operations. A corporate compliance
program may increase employee productivity by improving em-
ployee morale.290 Furthermore, corporate compliance training will
make employees feel appreciated, valued and a part of the success
of the health care entity.
4. Improvement in Corporate Communications
A corporate compliance program establishes infrastructure
necessary to effectively communicate changes in corporate policy.
A compliance program creates a centralized source for distributing
information pertaining to health care statutes, regulations and
other program directives related to fraud and abuse. Corporate
policy may be quickly distributed beyond upper level management
293to all employees.
B. Disadvantages of a Corporate Compliance Program
1. Documentation May Be Subject to Discovery
An effective corporate compliance program cannot be a few
pages in an employee handbook. It must be proactive in the detec-
tion and investigation of fraud and abuse. The primary disadvan-
tage of a corporate compliance program is that communication
and documentation generated by it may be subject to discovery. 
94
The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, however,
may ?rotect the communications from discovery if litigation
arises.
290. See Webb & Molt, supra note 278, at 377; see also Davis & McFarland, supra
note 274, at 34.
291. See id.
292. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 3.
293. Sanford V. Teplitzky, Developing and Implementing A Corporate Com-
pliance Program, Presentation at the National Health Lawyers Associa-
tion/American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys (NHLA/AAHA) Conference
(Oct. 30-31, 1997).
294. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 34-35.
295. See id. at 35.
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a. The Attorney-Client Privilege
One way of preventing disclosure of documentation generated
by internal investigations of a corporate compliance program is to
invoke the attorney-client privilege. 96 This privilege encourages
full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents. 9' The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advo-
cacy serves a public end and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.298 In the case
of Upjohn Co. v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court upheld the at-
torney-client privilege in a healthcare compliance setting. The
Court considered the following factors:
" communications were made by Upjohn employees;
* employees communicated with attorneys for Upjohn;
* employees communicated with the attorney at the di-
rection of corporate superiors;
e employee communications were made in order to ob-
tain legal advice;
* information was needed to supply a basis for legal ad-
vice concerning compliance with various laws, duties to
shareholders, and potential litigation;
e this information was not available from upper level
management;
* employee communications concerned matters within
the scope of the employees' corporate duties;
e employees knew that they were being questioned so the
corporation could acquire legal advice;
* pursuant to instruction of the chairman of the board,
the communications were considered "highly" confiden-
tial when made; and
* communications have been kept confidential by the
corporation.°°
If any of these elements are missing, a court may determine
that the attorney-client privilege does not apply and the documen-
tation is subject to discovery.30 Information received as a result of
296. See id.
297. See generally BLACK's LAw DICIONARY129 (6th ed. 1990).
298. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
299. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
300. See id. at 394-95.
301. See id. at 389.
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an internal investigation or monitoring should significantly involve
an attorney so that this information may be protected by the attor-• • 302
ney-client privilege. Although the attorney-client privilege is ap-
plicable to communications between a corporation's employee and
its in-house counsel, an attorney independent of the corporation
may be used because it eliminates questions about whether the in-
vestigation is truly for legal advice. 3 Any communications between
in-house counsel and employees for other than obtaining legal ad-
vice do not fall under the protection of the attorney-client privi-
304lege. If corporate documents are created because of the need for
legal advice, the privilege should protect the documents from dis-
305
covery.
It is unclear whether communications between the investigat-
ing attorney and a former corporate employee are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Some courts have decided that the attor-
ney-client privilege applies as long as the communications pertain
to the former employment and are needed to render legal advice
to the former employer.0 6 Other courts have rejected this notion
and have decided that the work product doctrine may protect this
type of communication.30 7  An attorney should exercise caution
when communicating with former employees of the health care en-
tity.
If any information received via the internal investigation is re-
vealed to a third party (other than outside counsel), the attorney-
client privilege is waived.08 According to the U.S. Sentencing
302. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 35. The attorney-client privilege
may not apply if in-house counsel participated in the internal investigation. See,
e.g., General Counsel v. United States, 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating
that to claim the attorney-client privilege a corporation has the burden to show
the communication was made to secure legal advice in contemplation of future
action by the attorney).
303. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 35.
304. See id.
305. See First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that documents created at counsel's request for assis-
tance in providing a legal opinion were privileged).
306. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that former employee's interview with corporate counsel
was protected by the attorney-client privilege); City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil
Co., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that conversations between
attorney and client remain privileged after the employee leaves).
307. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 478 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(stating that the documents arising from interviews with former employees fall
under the work product doctrine rather than the attorney-client privilege).
308. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 35.
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Guidelines, a corporation may have to turn over the investigative
report to the government in order to receive benefits under the
Corporate Compliance Guidelines.3°9 The power to waive the at-
torney-client privilege is a decision that is often made by the offi-
cers or directors of the corporation.310 The corporation is in a dif-
ficult position because in order to defend itself it must waive the
privilege, but doing so may increase the potential for other litiga-
tion.
Waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to one party may im-
ply a waiver as to another party. In the case of Permian Corp. v.
United States, 1 the court determined that one cannot waive the at-
312torney-client privilege from some and invoke it for others. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit expanded Permian doc-
trine and decided if information is disclosed to a federal agency,
the attorney-client privilege is waived for discovery requests made
313by third parties.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, r4 decided that a privilege is not
waived as to third parties. 5 The court's rationale was that a total
waiver creates a disincentive to voluntarily report corporate mis-
conduct, which directly conflicts with the objectives of a corporate
compliance program. Thus, a health care entity should determine
316the risk before making any communications to third parties.In addition, waiver about a specific topic may result in a waiver
309. SeeU.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g).
310. See In re GrandJury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979). "If
the employees had engaged in questionable activity, the corporation clearly would
have the power to waive the privilege and to turn the employees' statements over
to law enforcement officials." Id.
311. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
312. See id. at 1221 (finding that where a corporation has been willing to sacri-
fice confidentiality of document in order to expedite approval of an offer, the
corporation could not invoke attorney-client privilege to prevent the Securities
and Exchange Commission from providing access to those documents to the De-
partment of Energy).
313. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("For the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, there is nothing special about
another federal agency in the role of potential adversary as compared to private
party litigants acting as adversaries.").
314. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
315. See id. at 611.
316. See id. The court held that the voluntary disclosure of attorney-client
communications to the Securities Exchange Commission was a limited waiver of
the privilege. See id.
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of all privileged communications concerning the same topic."'
Currently, jurisdictions are split with regard to this type of waiver.
In the case of United States v. Pollard,"8 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that disclosure of a final report of an inves-
tigation waives the privilege with respect to all other documents."1
However, in the case of Von Bulow v. Von Bulow,"o the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that no waiver exists as
to other privileged communications if the disclosure of privilege
material would not prejudice the adversary in a judicial proceed-
ing.
321
Finally, as for partial disclosures, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit determined that "[w] hen a party discloses a por-
tion of otherwise privileged materials while withholding the rest,
the privilege is waived only as to those communications actually
disclosed, unless a partial waiver would be unfair to the party's ad-
versary. ,322
A solution to this waiver dilemma may be in adopting a bifur-
cated approach to the investigative process. The health care entity
may employ an independent investigator to conduct a factual inves-
tigation and compose a factual report that does not contain any
opinions or conclusions. This report could then be given to the at-
torney for the entity who would use it as a basis of rendering legal
advice. If the corporation has to disclose information to the gov-
ernment, it may satisfy the government by disclosing only the fac-
tual investigation. The attorney's legal conclusion and advice may
only be relevant to the extent that they support the government's
claim. A health care entity may successfully claim the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine if the attorney's opinions
and advice are not mixed with discoverable facts.
323
317. See United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.), 856 F.2d 619,
623-24 (4th Cir. 1988).
318. Id.
319. See id. at 622-24.
320. 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).
321. See id. at 102.
322. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1426 n.12 (3d Cir. 1991).
323. Daniel R. Roach, Implementing a Fraud and Abuse Compliance Program:
Practical Tips and Difficult Issues, Presentation at the National Health Lawyers As-
sociation/American Academy of Healthcare Attorneys (NHLA/AAHA) Confer-
ence (Oct. 30-31, 1997).
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b. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine protects from discovery documents
and "tangible things" that are prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial3 24 The doctrine protects the mental impressions and325
legal analysis of an attorney. It applies to both documents pre-
pared by an attorney as well as other materials prepared by agents
of the attorney.326
Materials may be discoverable, however, if the opposing party
can show a "substantial need" for the information. This excep-
tion permits disclosure of non-opinion work product such as wit-
ness interview notes that do not contain the mental impression of
the attorney.2 s Disclosure of interview notes is permissible when
the witness is no longer available for questioning.
Work product containing the mental impressions, opinions
and legal theories of an attorney are rarely discoverable. Rule
26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a "court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other represen-
tative of a party concerning the litigation." 3 ' This has been inter-
preted to mean that opinion work product cannot be discovered
even if there is a substantial need or when failing to reveal the in-
formation would cause undue hardship to the party seeking discov-
332
ery.
In the context of a corporate compliance program, documen-
tation created as part of an internal investigation may not be pro-
tected by the work product doctrine. Documentation created in
324. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (b) (3). The work product doctrine was first established
by the case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) and was later codified by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
325. SeeFED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id. (stating that the work product is only available upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the party's case and that the party cannot obtain the "substantial equivalent" of
the materials in another way).
330. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard (In re Martin Marietta Corp.), 856 F.2d
619, 626 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that opinion work product is to be afforded great
protection by courts); United States v. Rosenthal, 142 F.R.D. 389, 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (opining that courts should go to great lengths to protect work product).
331. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (3).
332. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730,
734 (4th Cir. 1974).
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conjunction with an internal investigation is only protected by the
work product doctrine if it is prepared in anticipation of litigation
and litigation was a possibility when it was created.333 A health care
entity must be prepared to prove that at the time the internal inves-
tigation documentation was created, litigation was possible.
The work product doctrine may be waived. Partial disclosure
of internal investigations can create difficulties, when disclosure is
to a government agency. Partial disclosure of investigation docu-
mentation creates a waiver of the work product doctrine. As a re-
sult, potential third-party claimants can get the documentation
through discovery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
334cuit is the only court that recognizes selective waiver. The court
decided that the work product doctrine may be waived with respect
to the government agency, but not with respect to third parties.
One way to address this dilemma outside of the Eighth Circuit
is to enter into an agreement with the government. The agree-
ment should provide that the disclosure is confidential and does
not constitute a waiver. The agreement should also refer to any
parallel or subsequent litigation and forbid disclosure to a third
party. This agreement may not withstand the scrutiny of the courts,
but may persuade the court that the health care entity was acting
reasonably in the face of a government enforcement action.
c. The Self-Evaluative Privilege
The self-evaluative privilege is recognized by only a few juris-
dictions. Currently, federal agencies do not recognize this privi-
lege, and federal courts construe it narrowly.3% This privilege pro-
tects materials related to an internal investigation and audit. The
self-evaluative privilege is more expansive than the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine by protecting the efforts of
management independent of any attorney involvement.
337
Self-evaluation by a health care entity assists in promoting an
333. See, e.g., In re GrandJury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Some possibility of litigation must exist."); Duffy v. United States (In re Grand
Jury Proceedings), 473 F.2d 840, 847 (8th Cir. 1973) ("The test of whether the
work product doctrine applies is not whether litigation has begun but whether
documents were prepared or obtained in anticipation of litigation.").
334. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977).
335. See id.
336. See Note, supra note 286, at 1797; see alsoJoseph E. Murphy & Roselee M.
Oyer, The Self-Evaluative Privilege and Beyond, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1993, at 11, 12.
337. See Note, supra note 286, at 1797.
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effective corporate compliance program. Results of an audit must
be available to all employees. If results are not disclosed to em-
ployees, the compliance program may be ineffective because em-
ployees will not be informed and able to modify their conduct to
avoid future violations.
339
The self-evaluative privilege may not always prevent discovery
of internal materials. A health care entity should assign the re-
sponsibility of performing an internal investigation to an internal
or independent corporate attorney. This will increase the likeli-
hood that the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine
will provide protection for the results of an internal investigation. 34 0
2. Implementation of an Ineffective Compliance Program is Harmful
Another disadvantage of a corporate compliance program is
that the failure to implement an "effective" program may harm the
health care entity. "[Compliance] programs hastily constructed
and implemented without appropriate ongoing monitoring will
likely be ineffective and could result in greater harm or liability to
the hospital than no program at all." 341 The OIG knows that even
an effective compliance program may not eliminate all instances of
fraud, abuse and waste. 2 The government will consider whether
the entity has made a sincere effort to adhere to federal and state
standards as well as the requirements of private health care pro-
343
grams. The OIG considers the effectiveness of a compliance pro-
gram when selecting an appropriate penalty." Severe penalties
will be imposed if the government deems the compliance program
ineffective, or recklessly implemented.
3. Mandatory Duty to Respond
Health care entities that implement a corporate compliance
program have an affirmative duty to respond to the unlawful and
unethical conduct of their employees. This is a disadvantage for
health care entities because it increases litigation with disgruntled
338. See id. at 1797-98.
339. See id. at 1798.
340. See Michael P. Kenny & William R. Mitchelson, Jr., Corporate Benefits of
Properly Conducted Internal Investigations, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 657, 678-79 (1995).
341. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 2.
342. See id. at 4.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 4 n.2.
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employees. An effective corporate compliance program may rem-
edy unlawful or unethical conduct by taking disciplinary action. If
prompt corrective action is taken, then a health care entity may re-
ceive a reduced penalty.45 An inappropriate response may increase
civil damages and may also result in punitive damages.
34 6
Disciplinary action, such as termination of employment, may
create litigation. Legal counsel should be consulted when discipli-
nary action is taken. The health care entity must be able to justify
the termination under the compliance program. The compliance
program may be modified if the employee conduct resulted from a
systemic problem. 37
4. Negative Publicity
Another disadvantage of a corporate compliance program is
that the discovery of unlawful and/or unethical employee conduct
may become public knowledge and result in negative publicity.
Negative publicity may harm the business operations of the health
care entity. Patients may hesitate to seek treatment at a hospital
that has been negatively portrayed in the media. If the entity does
not have a compliance program, the government may require theS 348
corporation publish the violation. The health care entity may
avoid negative press by establishing sound confidentiality policies
and procedures.
345. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f). An element of a compliance program for hospi-
tals is the development of a system to respond to allegations of improper and/or
illegal activities and the enforcement of appropriate disciplinary action against
employees who have violated internal compliance policies, applicable statutes,
regulations or federal health care program requirements. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, supra note 5, at 8.
346. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 36.
347. A compliance program must use audits and/or other evaluation tech-
niques to monitor compliance efforts and aid in the reduction of identified prob-
lem areas. "Detected but uncorrected misconduct can seriously endanger the mis-
sion, reputation, and legal status of the hospital." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
supra note 5, at 45.
348. U.S.S.G. § 8D1.4(a); Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Pun-
ishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387, 2389
(1992) (reviewing current modes of corporate punishment and identifying the
goals the publicity sanction must achieve and the pitfalls it must avoid).
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V. THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE FOR A
HEALTH CARE ENTIY 49
There is no cookie cutter answer on how to structure a corpo-
rate compliance program. Each health care entity is unique,
whether it be a large urban medical center or a small rural hospital.
Each entity should tailor its compliance program to set up the nec-
essary internal controls and monitoring systems needed to prevent
and correct unlawful conduct. The DHHS-OIG has suggested ele-
ments that can be incorporated into the managerial structure of
multi-hospital and integrated delivery systems.
These necessary elements include:550
(1) the development and distribution of written standards
of conduct, as well as written policies and procedures that
promote the hospital's commitment to compliance (for
example, by including adherence to compliance as an
element in evaluating managers and employees) and that
address specific areas of potential fraud, such as claims
development and submission processes, code gaming, and
financial relationships with physicians and other health
care professionals;
(2) the designation of a chief compliance officer and
other appropriate bodies, for example, a corporate com-
pliance committee, charged with the responsibility of op-
erating and monitoring the compliance program, and
who report directly to the CEO and the governing body;
(3) the development and implementation of regular, ef-
fective education and training programs for all affected
employees;
(4) the maintenance of a process, such as a hotline, to re-
ceive complaints, and the adoption of procedures to pro-
tect the anonymity of complainants and to protect whis-
tleblowers from retaliation;
(5) the development of a system to respond to allegations
349. The compliance program guidelines were published to promote voluntar-
ily developed and implemented compliance programs for the health care industry.
The guidelines are not limited to hospitals, but also include the agents of the hos-
pital and subproviders develop infrastructure to ensure compliance with the laws.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 1.
350. These elements are based on the seven steps of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k).
1999]
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of improper/illegal activities and the enforcement of ap-
propriate disciplinary action against employees who have
violated internal compliance policies, applicable statutes,
regulations or federal health care program requirements;
(6) the use of audits and/or other evaluation techniques
to monitor compliance and assist in the reduction of iden-
tified problem areas; and
(7) the investigation and remediation of identified sys-
temic problems and the development of policies address-
ing the non-employment or retention of sanctioned indi-
viduals.35
The OIG understands that all elements may not be imple-
mented at first, but suggests that the governing body and CEO
make a good faith commitment to ensure that a compliance pro-
gram is successful.
A. Establishing Written Compliance Policies and Procedures
Written policies and procedures must be developed and dis-
tributed when implementing a corporate compliance program.
These policies and procedures should be created by the compli-
ance officer and/or compliance committee. Policies and proce-
dures should be distributed to all affected employees. The policies
and procedures should establish criteria for how employees should
conduct themselves in all business relationships.
1. Standard of Conduct Policy
A health care entity should adopt a standard of conduct for its
employees. The standard of conduct should set forth a commit-
ment to the corporate compliance program by upper level man-
agement. The standard should establish the health care entity's
commitment to comply with all federal and state standards and
emphasize the prevention of fraud and abuse. The standard
should also state the mission, goals, and ethical requirements of the
corporate compliance program. Employees should understand the
standard of conduct policy. Therefore, the health care entity
should provide alternate versions of the policy, including a version
351. OFFICE OF INSPEcTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 7-8.
352. See id. at 6-7.
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in large print and versions in foreign languages. The policy should
also be written at an appropriate reading level. s
2. Special Risk Areas
The written policies and procedures should analyze the poten-
tial liability for each function or department of the health care en-
tity. 3  Corporate compliance policies should be tailored to specific
risk areas. For example, a staff nurse does not need to learn about
all the intricacies of the billing process but may benefit from a
more general discussion about billing and the compliance pro-
gram. The OIG suggests that policies and procedures coordinate
with training and educational programs with emphasis on the fol-
lowing areas:
(1) Billing for items or services not actually rendered;356
(2) Providing medically unnecessary services;
357
(3) Upcoding
(4) "DRG creep;
" 3
59
(5) Outpatient services rendered in connection with in-
patient stays;
36°
(6) Teaching physician and resident requirements for
353. See id. at 8-9.
354. See id. at 11.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 12.
357. See id. at 13. Intentionally seeking reimbursement for a service rendered
that is not warranted by the patient's current and documented medical condition.
See id. at 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1) (A) (1994)).
358. See id. Upcoding is the use of a billing code that provides a higher pay-
ment than the billing code that properly reflects the health care service rendered.
See id. at 14 n.15. The HIPAA established an additional civil monetary penalty to
the OIG's sanction authorities for upcoding violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7a(a) (1) (A) (Supp. III 1997).
359. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 14. "DRG Creep" is the
practice of billing using a Diagnosis Related Group ("DRG") that provides a
higher payment than the DRG code that properly reflects the health care service
rendered. See id. at 14 n.16.
360. See id. This is known as the 72-hour window investigation. Under Medi-
care billing rules, tests performed within 72 hours of an admission to a facility are
considered part of the inpatient stay and are reimbursed under the hospital's DRG
payment. However, hospitals have billed separately for these tests which has re-
sulted in double payment. See id.
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teaching hospitals;
36'
(7) Duplicate billing;362
(8) False cost reports; s
(9) Unbundling;
(10) Billing for discharge in lieu of transfer;
365
(11) Patients' freedom of choice;
36
(12) Credit balances - failure to refund;
367
(13) Hospital incentives that violate the Anti-kickback
statute or other similar federal or state statute or regula-
tion;
36
(14) Joint ventures;389
(15) Financial arrangements between hospitals and
hospital-based physicians;
37°
(16) Stark physician self-referral law;
371
(17) Knowing failure to provide covered services or nec-
essa7 care to members of a health maintenance organiza-
tion; and
(18) "Patient Dumping.373
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id. at 16. Unbundling occurs when bills for medical treatment are
submitted in a fragmented fashion to maximize the reimbursement for various
tests or procedures that are required to be billed together at a reduced cost. See id.
at 16 n.20.
365. See id. According to Medicare laws, when a prospective payment system
("PPS") hospital transfers a patient to another PPS facility, the hospital to which
the patient is transferred may charge the full DRG. See id. at 16 n.21. The trans-
ferring hospital may only charge Medicare for costs per diem. See id.
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 17.
369. See id. at 18.
370. See id.
371. See id. at 19.
372. See id.
373. Id. at 20. "Patient Dumping" is addressed by the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), which requires that hospitals that
operate an emergency department that participate in the Medicare program that:
(1) provide appropriate medical screening examination upon request to deter-
mine whether an individual has an emergency medical condition; and (2) if the
person has such a condition, (a) stabilize that condition; or (b) appropriately
transfer the patient to another hospital. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A)-(B)
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These are only some of the areas of risk. These areas of con-
cern have been compiled as a result of the recent investigative and
audit efforts of the OIG. These areas should be part of the compli-
ance program by incorporating them into the written policies and
procedures, as well as employee training.
3. Establishing a Claim Development and Submission Process
The Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals sets forth
recommendations for structuring a billing process. Often a corpo-
rate compliance program is imposed by a settlement agreement be-
tween the OIG and various health care entities. 74 Thus, the OIG is
in a better position to render advice about what are acceptable
processes to ensure compliance with federal and state laws and
program requirements. 7 5 The written policies and procedures of
the health care entity should reflect and reinforce current federal
and state law with regard to the submission of claims and Medicare
cost reports. 7 6 Written policies and procedures should:
(1) provide for proper and timely documentation of all
physician and other professional services prior to billing
to ensure that only accurate and properly documented
services are billed;
(2) emphasize that claims should be submitted only when
appropriate documentation supports the claims and only
when such documentation is maintained and available for
audit and review. The documentation which may include
patient records, should record the length of time spent in
conducting the activity leading to the record entry, and
the identity of the individual providing the service. The
hospital should consult with its medical staff to establish
other appropriate documentation guidelines;
(3) state that, consistent with appropriate guidance from
medical staff, physician and hospital records and medical
(1994).
374. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 20. When the Govern-
ment imposes a corporate compliance program against a corporation, it is termed
a "corporate integrity" agreement. See id. Such agreements were often required in
addition to the payment of civil damages and/or criminal fines and penalties. See
id.
375. See id.
376. See id.
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notes used as a basis for a claim submission should be ap-
propriately organized in a legible form so they can be
audited and reviewed;
(4) indicate that the diagnosis and procedures reported
on the reimbursement claim should be based on the
medical record and other documentation, and that the
documentation necessary for accurate code assignment
should be available to coding staff; and
(5) provide that the compensation for billing department
coders and billing consultants should not provide any fi-
nancial incentives to improperly upcode claims.
Written policies and procedures about coding should reflect
current reimbursement standards as established by applicable regu-
lations and should be developed along with private payor and or-
178
ganizational standards.
4. Records Retention Policy
a. General Policy
A corporate compliance program should create a records
management and retention policy. s79  Policies and procedures
should be developed with regards to the creation, distribution, re-
tention, storage retrieval and destruction of documents.m0 Health
care entities should develop a records retention policy that consid-
ers the use of the records for patient care, adherence to state and
federal law, accreditation requirements, possible government or in-
ternal investigations, and state and federal statutes of limitations.
A records retention policy should start with an inventory of all
records created and received by each department of the health
care entity. This may be accomplished by a facility-wide written
survey. The survey should ask what documents exist in each de-
377. Id. at 21.
378. See id. Regulations include the official coding guidelines created by
HCFA, the National Center for Health Statistics, the American Medical Associa-
tion and the American Health Information Management Association, Interna-
tional Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification ("ICD-CM");
1998 Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System
("HCPCS"); and Physicians' Current Procedural Terminology ("CPT"). See id. at
21 n.27.
379. See id. at 29.
380. See id. at 30.
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partment and whether the department has a record retention pol-
icy.38 1 This survey should be followed up with an in-person inter-
view with a staff member from each department.382 The interview
should determine if other documents exists that were not men-
3813tioned on the survey.
The policy should set forth what records are and are not cre-
ated by each department. These requirements should be included
in employment policies and procedures. It should also establish
employee disciplinary Uocedures for failure to comply with the re-
cords retention policy.
The records policy must identify how each record created or
received is distributed both within and outside the facility. Distri-
bution should be limited and monitored. The policy should con-
tain a strict provision pertaining to document reproduction. The
provision should set forth whether a document may be copied and
to whom it may be distributed.385 Distribution beyond the policy• • 386
must be prohibited.
The record policy must also set forth schedules for the de-
struction of documents as well as the method of destruction.
Schedules should be created for all records authorized to be pre-
served, along with retention dates for each category of records.
Destruction methods should be designed to ensure total destruc-
tion of the documents. Document destruction should be complete
and conducted in a way that maintains the confidentiality of the
381. See Karen S. Guarino, Developing A Comprehensive Medical Records Manage-
ment and Retention Policy, 8 HEALTHSPAN 14, 14-15 (1994).
382. See id.
383. See id. Guarino notes:
Often forgotten documents include inter or intra office memoranda
(both written or electronic mail), construction records, plant and prop-
erty records (including maintenance and repair reports for both build-
ings and equipment), ethics committee records, market research data,
consultant reports, certificates of insurance, real and personal property
records, internal audit reports, employment inquiries, grant applications
and reports and accountings, plant safety and technology records, and
training manuals.
Id. at 15.
384. See id. at 15.
385. See id. Reproduction may include microfilm. Microfilming may have to
be performing in accordance with an approved procedure for the records to be
admissible in court and acceptable to government agencies. See id.
386. See id.
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documents.
3 8 7
A procedure must be developed for the storage of records.
Storage must permit or restrict access as needed. For example, ac-
cess to substance abuse, mental health and employee health rec-
ords should be restricted because of heightened confidentiality re-
quirement. 8 Finally, the records retention program should
institute management procedures that ensure compliance with the
laws. This should include monitoring the creation of paper and
electronic records, distribution, duplication, storage, retention,
and destruction.389
b. Specic Requirement of Medicare for Record Retention
The Medicare program has many requirements for the reten-
tion of records. The Medicare program has different periods of re-
tention for different types of records. The Medicare program re-
quires hospitals to retain medical records in their original or legally
reproduced form for a period of at least five years in order to par-
ticipate in the program. Records for specific health care services
must be retained for various periods of time as a condition for par-
ticipation in the Medicare program. Radiological records, includ-
ing copies of printouts, reports, films, scans and other image rec-
ords must be kept for five years. 1 Laboratory test requisitions and
records of patient testing, including the original report must be re-. 392
tained for a minimum of two years after the date of reporting.
Immunohematology records must be retained for no less than five
393years. Pathology test reports must be kept for ten years from the
date of the reporting.
Medicare requires health care providers to retain and make
available records and documents pertinent to the amount of Medi-
387. See id. at 14-15.
388. See id. The federal regulations protecting confidentiality of alcohol and
drug abuse treatment and recovery do not set forth a period of retention. How-
ever, these records must be kept in a secure room, locked in a file cabinet, safe or
similar container when not in use. See id. at 17 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 2.16 (1998)).
389. See id. at 15.
390. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 482.24 (b)(1) (1998)).
391. See id. at 16 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 482.26 (d)(2)).
392. See id. at 8 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1105, .1107, & .1109).
393. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1107, .1109; 21 C.F.R. § 606.160(b)
(1998)).
394. Seeid. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 493.1109 (1998)).
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care payments due.9 5 Hospitals must retain clinical and other
medical records relating to Medicare claims for five years after the
396month the Medicare cost report is filed 6. If the health care pro-
vider appeals a reimbursement decision, relevant records should be
kept until the decision at the appellate level is obtained.397
In addition, Medicare also has specific retention requirements
for long-term care facilities, home health agencies,399 comprehen-
400sive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, clinics and rehabilitation
agencies which provide outpatient physical therapy and/or speech
pathology services,40 1 and for end-stage renal disease services.
B. Compliance Oversight Responsibilities
The demand for corporate compliance in the health care in-
dustry has resulted in the creation of new lucrative positions as
403
compliance officers. The salary for a compliance officer ranges
from $50,000 for $200,000. There are no statistics available on
the number of hospitals and health systems with compliance offi-
cers, but industry experts estimate that about five percent of hospi-
tals have compliance officers.
The DHHS-OIG recommends that a hospital appoint both a
395. See id. at 16 (citing PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL, PRM-1, § 2304.1).
396. See id. (citing MEDICARE HosPrrAL MANUAL, HIM-10, §§ 413, 413.1).
397. See id. at 8.
398. The retention period is often required by state law, but if a state require-
ment does not exist, then for five years for the date of discharge for adults and for
a minor for three years after the resident reaches a legal age as set forth by state
law. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(1) (1998)).
399. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 484.38 (1998)). Records must be retained for
five years after the month that the relevant cost report is filed. See id.
400. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 485.60(c) (1998)). Records must be retained for
five years after patient discharge. See id.
401. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 405.1722(d) (1998)). The period of record re-
tention is determined by the state. See id. If there is no state provision, then the
retention period is for five years after the date of discharge for adults and, for mi-
nors, three years after the patient becomes of age under state law or five years after
discharge, whichever is longer. See id.
402. See id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 2139(e) (1998)). The state usually sets forth the
record retention requirement. See id. However, if no state provision exists, then
the records should be retained for five years from the date of discharge, for mi-
nors, for three years after the patient reaches the age of majority. See id.
403. Deanna Bellandi, Rolling Out the Red Carpet, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 29,
1997, at 28, 32.
404. See id.
405. See id. (quoting Lori Walters, administrator of the American Compliance
Institute).
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compliance officer and a compliance committee to oversee the
compliance efforts of the health care entity.40 6 The corporate com-
pliance program may be the sole duty or added to other manage-
ment responsibilities of an individual so long as the compliance
function is not neglected or tainted by the individual's manage-407
ment perspective. A separate compliance function may ensure
independent and objective legal review and financial analysis of the
health care entity's compliance efforts.40 A corporate compliance
officer should be a high-level employee with direct access to the
governing body and the chief executive officer ("CEO") of the
health care entity.4 In addition, the OIG suggests that a multi-
hospital organization coordinate with each hospital owned by the
corporation or foundation via a headquarter-based compliance of-
ficer who works with parallel positions at each facility or regional
office.41°
The OIG recommends that responsibilities of a corporate
compliance officer include the following:
(1) overseeing and monitoring the implementation of the
compliance program;
(2) reporting on a regular basis to the hospital's govern-
ing body, CEO and compliance committee on the prog-
ress of implementation, and assisting these components in
establishing methods to improve the hospital's efficiency
and quality of services, and to reduce the hospital's vul-
nerability to fraud, abuse and waste;
(3) periodically revising the program in light of changes
in the needs of the organization, and in the law and poli-
cies and procedures of government and private payor
health plans;
(4) developing, coordinating, and participating in a multi-
faceted educational and training program that focuses on
the elements of the compliance program, and seeds to en-
sure that all appropriate employees and management are
knowledgeable of, and comply with, pertinent federal and
406. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 31 n.35.
407. See id. at 31.
408. See id. at 31 n.35. The OIG will consider the size and resources of each
health care entity and understands that smaller facilities may not be able to estab-
lish a compliance officer whose sole duty is a compliance function. See id.
409. See id.
410. See id. at3l n.36.
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state standards;
(5) ensuring that independent contractors and agents
who furnish medical services to the hospital are aware of
the requirements of the hospital's compliance program
with respect to coding, billing, and marketing, among
other things;
(6) coordinating personnel issues with the hospital's Hu-
man Resources office (or its equivalent) to ensure that the
National Practitioner Data Bank and Cumulative Sanction
Report have been checked with respect to all employees,
medical staff and independent contractors;
(7) assisting the hospital's financial management in coor-
dinating internal compliance review and monitoring ac-
tivities, including annual or periodic reviews of depart-
ments;
(8) independently investigating and acting on matters re-
lated to compliance, including the flexibility to design
and coordinate internal investigations (e.g., responding to
reports of problems or suspected violations) and any re-
sulting corrective action with all hospital departments,
providers and sub-providers, agents and, independent
contractors; and
(9) developing policies and programs that encourage
managers and employees to report suspected fraud and
other improprieties without fear of retaliation.
The health care entity must use due care and not assign over-
sight responsibilities to individuals with the propensity to engage in
412illegal activities. The compliance officer is a very prominent posi-
tion that requires access to all documents and information related
to compliance activities, which may include patient records, billing
413records, marketing strategies, employment and other contracts.
The OIG suggests that a compliance committee be established
to advise and assist the corporate compliance officer.414 Members
of the compliance committee should include the corporate com-
pliance officer and other high-level employees with executive or
411. See id. at 31-32.
412. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 375.
413. See OFFIcE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 33.
414. Seeid. at34.
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policy-making authority.41 ' The corporate compliance committee
should furnish various perspectives by including committee mem-
bers who represent different operations within the corporation
such as finance, audit, human resources, utilization review, social
work, discharge planning, medicine, coding and legal as well as
other key operating departments.
4 1
6
The DHHS-OIG recommends the following compliance com-
mittee functions:
(1) analyzing the organizations' industry environment,
the legal requirements with which it must comply, and
specific risk areas;
(2) assessing existing policies and procedures that address
these areas for possible incorporation into the compliance
program;
(3) working with appropriate hospital departments to de-
velop standards of conduct and policies and procedures to
promote compliance with the institution's program;
(4) recommending and monitoring, in conjunction with
the relevant departments, the development of internal sys-
tems and controls to carry out the organization's stan-
dards, policies and procedures as part of its daily opera-
tions;
(5) determining the appropriate strategy/approach to
promote compliance with the program and detection of
any potential violations, such as through hotlines and
other fraud reporting mechanisms; and
(6) developing a system to solicit, evaluate and respond to
complaints and problems.417
Depending on the size and resources of a health care entity,
415. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 382 (citing U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3
(b)).
416. See OFFICE OF INSPEcrOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 30 n.34. The OIG sug-
gests that its Management Advisory Report entitled "Financial Arrangements be-
tween Hospitals and Hospital-Based Physicians," Special Fraud Alerts, audit and
inspection reports, and advisory opinions, as well as the annual OIG work plan
may be the basis for standard, educational courses and programs for appropriate
hospital employees. See id. at 35 n.40.
417. Id. at 34.
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the compliance committee may address other functions. 418 The
compliance committee may issue an annual report to demonstrate
their effectiveness. In addition, the committee and/or compliance
officer should be evaluated regularly but not less than once per
year.
C. Employee Training
Corporate officers, managers, employees, physicians, and
other health care professionals should receive corporate compli-
ance training.4 9 The OIG suggests that a health care entity com-
municate its standards and procedures to all affected employees,
420physicians, independent contractors and other significant agents.
The best way to communicate compliance program standards
and procedures to employees depends on the type of health care
entity, procedures, and the composition of the work force. A single
4211training program may not be sufficient for the entire work force.
A health care entity should train employees in accordance with
their responsibilities, educational backgrounds, and the impact of
422the compliance program on them.
Health care entities may train employees by using written ma-
terials, seminars, videos, computer software programs, and vi-
423gnettes. Interactive training is more effective than lectures and
424presentations that do not involve audience participation. Train-
ing in different languages may be necessary for health care entities
with a culturally diverse staff.4 25 Targeted compliance training
should be provided to corporate officers, managers and employees
whose actions affect the accuracy of the claims submitted to the
government, such as those involved in coding, billing, cost report-
426ing and marketing processes.
The OIG recommends that employee training should include
the following areas:
418. See id.
419. See id. at 35.
420. See id.
421. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 394.
422. See id.
423. See id.
424. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 35.
425. See id.
426. See id.
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(1) government and private payor reimbursement prin-
ciples;
(2) general prohibitions on paying or receiving remu-
neration to induce referrals;
(3) proper confirmation of diagnoses;
(4) submitting a claim for physician services when ren-
dered by a non-physician (i.e., the "incident to" rule and
the physician physical presence requirement);
(5) signing a form for a physician without the physician's
authorization;
(6) alterations to medical records;
(7) prescribing medications and procedures without
proper authorization;
(8) proper documentation of services rendered; and
(9) duty to report misconduct.
427
Educating employees about these areas of concerns may clarify
428whether an activity is prohibited by the compliance program.
Participation in a training program should be mandatory.4'
The corporate compliance program should require employees to
have a minimum number of educational hours per year. New
employees should receive compliance training early in their em-
ployment but training should be ongoing.43 Compliance program
432
refresher training should be regularly offered. Corporate com-
pliance training may be made a condition of employment. A
health care entity may provide that failure to comply with training
program requirements will result in disciplinary action or termina-
tion. Completion of training requirements should also be con-
sidered in the employee's annual evaluation.344
427. Id. at 36.
428. See id.
429. See id. at 37.
430. See id. at 36. The OIG has entered into 165 corporate integrity agree-
ments that require specific hours of training. See id. at 36 n.42. The OIG usually
requires a minimum of one to three hours annually for basic training in compli-
ance areas. See id. More hours are required for specialty employment positions
such as billing and coding. See id.
431. See id. at 35.
432. SeeWebb & Molo, supra note 278, at 394.
433. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 37.
434. See id.
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The health care entity must be able to demonstrate to the gov-
ernment that employees were properly trained.3 5 Employees
should certify they received the training materials and participated
in a training program. Attendance at all compliance program em-
ployee training should be documented in the employee's person-
nel file.
D. Reporting Unlawful/Unethical Conduct: Establishing the Lines of
Communication
The compliance officer must be accessible to hospital person-
436
nel in order for a compliance program to be successful. Policies
regarding confidentiality of communication and non-retaliation
should be developed and distributed to all employees to encourage
communication and reporting of unlawful and unethical con-
duct.43' The compliance committee should structure several ways
to report fraud, waste, or abuse so that such reports cannot be di-
verted by supervisors or other personnel .
The OIG also recommends that a health care entity establish a
procedure for hospital personnel to seek clarification from the
compliance officer or members of the committee if any confusion
or questions arise about the compliance policy or procedure. In-
quiries and answers should be documented and, if appropriate,
shared with others so that standards, policies and procedures may
be updated and/or clarified." °
The OIG suggests using hotlines, e-mails, written memoranda,
newsletters, and other forms of information exchange to maintain
open lines of communication."' If a hotline is established, the
telephone number should be available to employees and posted in
442common work areas. Health care entities should also post the
Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General Hotline
telephone number along side the organization's hotline number.44
435. See id. (recommending that hospital retain records of training including
attendance logs and copies of materials distributed).
436. See id. at 38.
437. See id.
438. See id.
439. See id.
440. See id.
441. See id. at 39.
442. See id.
443. See id. at 39 n.46. The DHHS-OIG Hotline number is 1-800-HHS-TIPS.
See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General
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The compliance program should be structured so that employees
have the option to anonymously submit fraud, abuse and waste re-
ports.44  Reports of unlawful or unethical conducted should be• . 445
documented and promptly investigated. The compliance officer
should maintain documentation that track reports and telephone
calls, the nature of any internal investigation and the results. 4 6 The
compliance program should establish infrastructure to maintain
the confidentiality of an employee's identity. However, employ-
ees should be informed that their identities may be revealed if gov-
ernment authorities become involved in the investigation.48
E. Compliance Program Disciplinary Action
Failure to comply with the compliance program should result
in disciplinary action.449 Noncompliance with hospital standards of
conduct, policies and procedures, or federal and state laws may
damage the reputation of the entity as a reliable, honest and trust-. 450
worthy health care provider. A health care entity's commitment
to corporate compliance may be demonstrated by the strength and
severity of its disciplinary efforts.
The OIG recommends that a written disciplinary policy be dis-
tributed to all employees.4 5' This policy should clearly establish the
degrees of disciplinary actions. 45' There should be significant sanc-
tions for intentional or reckless noncompliance.45' These sanctions
may include oral warnings, suspension, privilege revocation, termi-
nation of employment, and/or financial penalties. 4 5 4 The policy
should set forth procedures for handling disciplinary problems.
Discipline may be addressed by managers or senior administra-
(visited Nov. 7, 1999) <http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig/>. The DHHS-OIG
may be reached by mail at Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and
Human Services, Attn. Hotline, 330 Independence Ave. S.W., Washington D.C.
20201. See id.
444. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 39.
445. See id.
446. See id.
447. See id.
448. See id.
449. See id. at 40.
450. See id. at 39.
451. See id. at 40.
452. See id.
453. See id.
454. See id.
455. See id.
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456tors. Managers and supervisors should discipline employees in an
appropriate and consistent manner.45 ' All employees should be
subject to the same disciplinary action regardless of their status
458within the health care entity. Management may be held respon-
sible for the foreseeable noncompliant behavior of their subordi-
nates. 459 Furthermore, to increase the deterrent effect, the health
care entity may consider disclosure of the disciplinary action im-
posed on an employee to other similarly situated employees to theS 460
extent legally possible. This may motivate other employees to
avoid misconduct.
461
A health care entity should avoid hiring individuals who are
inclined to behave in an unlawful and/or unethical manner. This
may be accomplished by conducting a background investigation
462that includes a reference check. The employment application
should specifically ask the applicant to disclose any criminal convic-
tion 46 or exclusion from any health care reimbursement program
like Medicare.4
The health care entity should establish a policy that prohibits
the employment of individuals who have been convicted of a
criminal offense related to health care or who are debarred, ex-
cluded or otherwise ineligible for participation in federal health
465care programs. A policy should also be established to prohibit
contracting with independent contractors or other agents who also
have a criminal conviction related to health care or have been de-
barred, excluded or are ineligible for participation in federal
466health care programs. If criminal charges are alleged or
debarment or exclusion is sought, that employee should be re-
lieved of all responsibility for, or involvement in, any federal health
care program until the matter is resolved.47  If a conviction,
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. See id.
460. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 395.
461. See id.
462. See OFFICE OF INSPECrOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 40-41.
463. See id. at 41. "Criminal conviction" is defined by statute. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7(i) (1994).
464. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 41.
465. See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (ineligibility
provisions).
466. See OFFICE OF INSPECrOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 41 n.48.
467. See id. at 41.
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debarment, or exclusion results then employment should be ter-
minated.46
F. Monitoring and Auditing
Reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that employees
abide with the standards established under the compliance pro-469
gram. Therefore, the compliance program should have a moni-
toring and auditing feature. This may be conducted by inside em-
470ployees or outside consultants.
Periodic audits may ensure compliance with the policies and
procedures of the health care entity as well as federal, state, and lo-
cal laws and regulations. The audit at a minimum should address
Anti-kickback laws,471 illegal physician self-referrals under Stark
472law, International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical
Modification ("ICD-CM"), 1998 Health Care Financing Administra-
tion Common Procedure Coding System ("HCPCS") and Physi-
cians' Current Procedural Terminology ("CPT") coding, claim de-
velopment and submission, reimbursement, cost reporting and
473marketing. Individuals performing the audits should have access
to all information, personnel, areas of operations, and existing
corporate auditing resources. The audit should address hospital
relationships with third-party contractors.474 The audit should also
inquire into compliance with specific rules and policies that have
468. See id.
469. See id. at 42.
470. See id.; see generally George M. Burditt, Corporate Compliance Audits, 51 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 217 (1996) (discussing corporate compliance monitoring and audits
for FDA-regulated industries). The OIG suggests that the auditor or monitoring
reviewer should:
(1) be independent of physicians and line management;
(2) have access to existing audit and health care resources, relevant per-
sonnel and all relevant areas of operation;
(3) present written evaluative reports on compliance activities to the
CEO, governing body and members of the compliance committee on a
regular basis, but not less than annually; and
(4) specifically identify areas where corrective actions are needed.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 44.
471. See id. at 42. See generally supra Part lIIA and accompanying notes.
472. These are known as the Stark Laws. See supra Part III.B and accompany-
ing notes.
473. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 42.
474. See id.
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been focused on by Medicare fiscal intermediaries or carriers and
law enforcement, as demonstrated by OIG Special Fraud Alerts,
OIG audits and evaluations, and law enforcement's initiatives.475
A comprehensive internal audit should first be conducted
when the compliance program is developed and repeated on a
regular periodic basis thereafter.Or This provides a "snapshot" ofS 477
operations from a compliance perspective. The snapshot estab-
lishes a baseline for the compliance activities, which assists the
compliance officer and others in identifying and reviewing devia-
tions therefrom.478 If the deviation is for a legitimate reason, the
compliance officer, hospital administrator, or manager may take
limited or no disciplinary action.479 If the deviation occurred be-
cause of an improper procedure or misinterpretation of policy,• 480
corrective action should be taken. Any resulting overpayments• 481
should be paid back to the affected payor. The health care entity
should report to the government deviations that are the result of
fraud or systemic problems.
48
2
The monitoring process should determine whether the ele-
ments of the compliance program have been satisfied.4 3 This will
determine the conformity of all departments with the compliance
program.44 This review may provide evidence that the appropriate
documentation has been created and maintained as part of the im-
plementation of an effective compliance program.
The OIG recommends the techniques that should be utilized
as part of the monitoring and auditing process as follows:
(1) on-site visits;
475. See id.
476. See id. at 42-43.
477. See id. at 43 n.51.
478. See id. Sampling protocols may be utilized as a monitoring technique to
evaluate variations from the established baseline. See id. at 43.
479. See id. at 43.
480. See id.
481. See id.
482. See id. at 43 n.52. Monitoring may also include a review of reserves that
the hospital has establish for payments to Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE or any
other federal health care program. If the reserves include funds that should have
been paid, then prompt payment should be made to the affected payor regardless
of whether a demand for payment has been made. See id. at 43.
483. See id. at 44.
484. See id.
485. See id.
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(2) interviews with personnel involved in management,
operations, coding, claim development and submission,
patient care, and other related activities;
(3) questionnaires developed to solicit impressions of a
broad cross-section of the hospital's employees and staff;
(4) reviews of medical and financial records and other
source documents that support claims for reimbursement
and Medicare cost reports;
(5) reviews of written materials and documentation pre-
pared by the different divisions of a hospital; and
(6) trend analyses, or longitudinal studies, that seek devia-
tions, positive or negative, in specific areas over a given• -486
period.
Use of these techniques may generate reports that permit correc-
tive action for past conduct and prevent reoccurrence of the same
487difficulty. Subsequent reviews should be conducted to ensure
that the corrective action was actually taken and it ameliorated the
4881problem.
G. Modification of the Compliance Program: Responses to Internal and
External Investigations
The OIG has made specific recommendations with regard to
modifications of a compliance program in response to an investiga-
489tion. Upon a report or other indication of noncompliance, an
internal investigation should be immediately conducted to deter-
mine whether federal, state or local law, or the compliance pro-
gram requirements have been violated. 490 If a violation has oc-
curred, the health care entity may seek the advice of an attorney to
491plan an appropriate response.
486. Id.
487. See id. at 45.
488. See id.
489. See id.
490. See id.
491. See id. at 45-46. An appropriate response may include the internal devel-
opment of a corrective action plan, referral to criminal and/or civil law enforce-
ment, reporting to the government and repayment of any overpayments. See id. at
46.
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1. General Reporting to the Government and the Operation Restore
Trust Program
An appropriate response may include making a report to theS492
appropriate federal and state government officials. The health
care entity should report misconduct within a reasonable period of
time, but no longer than sixty days after determining whether a vio-
lation has occurred . 93  Serious violations may require immediate
reporting prior to, or simultaneously with, the commencement of
494
an internal investigation. In instances where fraud and abuse are
involved, the government has established a voluntary disclosure
program that is referred to as Operation Restore Trust. 49 5 This vol-
untary disclosure program was created because the government re-
alized that it cannot maintain the integrity of Medicare and other
federal health care programs without the assistance of health care
496
providers by way of their self-policing efforts. Operation Restore
492. See id. at 50 n.60. "Appropriate federal and state authorities" include the
Criminal and Civil Divisions of the Department ofJustice, the U.S. Attorney in the
hospital's district, and the investigative arms for the agencies administering the
affected federal or state health care programs, such as the state Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the Offices of In-
spector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs and the Office of Personnel Management (which admin-
isters the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program). See id.
493. See id. at 47-48.
494. See id. at 48 n.58. Immediate notification to governmental authorities is
required if the conduct:
(1) is a clear violation of criminal law;
(2) has a significant adverse effect on the quality of care provided to
program beneficiaries (in addition to any other legal obligations regard-
ing quality of care); or
(3) indicates evidence of a systemic failure to comply with applicable
laws, and existing corporate integrity agreement, or other standards of
conduct, regardless of the financial impact on federal health care pro-
grams.
Id.
495. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 40. Operation Restore Trust began as a two-
year federal project that focused its efforts on home health agencies, nursing
homes, durable medical equipment suppliers, and hospices in the states of New
York, Illinois, California, Florida, and Texas. See id. These states were chosen be-
cause they accounted for one-half of all of the nation's Medicare beneficiaries and
Medicaid recipients. See id. This project initially resulted in 50 criminal convic-
tions, 48 civiljudgments and 149 exclusions. See BARBARAJ. YOUNGBERG ET AL., THE
RISKMANAGER'S DESKREFERENCE 109-10 (2d ed. 1998).
496. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 46 n.55.
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Trust has the following requirements:
(1) the disclosure must be on behalf of an entity and not
an individual;
(2) the disclosure must be truly voluntary with no pending
proceeding or governmental investigation;
(3) the entity must disclose the nature of the wrongdoing
and resulting harm to the federal programs; and
(4) the entity must not be the subject of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding before or after the self-disclosure.497
Operation Restore Trust is applicable to home health agen-
cies, nursing homes, durable medical equipment companies
("DME"), clinical laboratories, long-term care, inpatient psychiat-
498nic, rural health clinics, and community mental health centers.
Currently, Operation Trust is applicable only in the states of Cali-
fornia, Florida, New York, Texas, Illinois, Arizona, Colorado, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Newjersey, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.
In a May 1997 press release, the federal government an-
nounced that Operation Restore Trust recovered $187.5 million in
overpayments, restitution, fines and settlements owed to the gov-
ernment.50 It also resulted in seventy-four criminal convictions and
218 provider exclusions for inappropriately billed or medically un-
necessary services. The OIG indicates that false claims were as
high as sixty-six percent in some the nursing homes investigated
under this program.
In general, a health care entity should voluntarily disclose the
unlawful and/or unethical conduct, so that the penalties imposed
511for the violation may be reduced °. It is better for a health care en-
497. Id.
498. See Eiland, supra note 48, at 40. The OIG issued a report on July 28, 1997
which states that one-fourth of the providers in the initial five states of California,
Florida, New York, Texas, and Illinois, were "problem" providers who defrauded
the program. See id.
499. See id.
500. See id.
501. See id.
502. See id.
503. See U.S.S.G. § 8C4.1 (1994). The United States Sentencing Guidelines
provide a reduction in fines for entities that self-report, or assist the Government
in its investigation and recognize and accept responsibility for the unlawful or un-
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tity to voluntarily disclose the improper conduct than to be caught
up in a cover-up by the government or by employees who may
bring a qui tam action.
2. Internal Investigation Responses
An internal investigation is a proper response to misconduct
within the health care entity. As stated previously, internal investi-
gations may include interviews, on-site visits, access and review of all
relevant documentation, development of questionnaires and/or
surveys, audits and possibly the involvement of an independent at-
torney outside of the entity.5°4 The compliance office should take
steps to ensure that all relevant documentation or other evidence is• . . 505
not destroyed pending the investigation.
Additionally, if it is determined that the integrity of the inter-
nal investigation is at stake because of the employees under investi-
gation, those individuals should be relieved from their work re-
506sponsibilities until the investigation is complete. However, if an
internal or government undercover operation is implemented as a
part of an investigation, then the individual should still perform
their assigned work activities."'
ethical conduct. Section 8C4.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides:
Substantial Assistance to Authorities--Organizations (Policy Statement)
(a) Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another organization that has committed an offense, or in the investi-
gation of prosecution of an individual not directly affiliated with the
defendant who has committed an offense, the court may depart from
the guidelines.
(b) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated on the record that may include, but are not limited to,
consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of
the organization's assistance, taking into consideration the gov-
ernment's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the nature and extent of the organization's assistance; and
(3) the timeliness of the organization's assistance.
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing mitigating
factors considered for violations of fraud and abuse laws); 62 Fed. Reg. 67,392
(Dec. 24, 1997).
504. See supra Part V.F and accompanying notes.
505. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 5, at 41.
506. See id. at 47.
507. See id.
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Finally, the corporate compliance officer should review the
events that gave rise to the investigation and determine whether
similar problems have been uncovered.' °s
The final response to a detected offense is the identification
and restitution of any overpayment to the affected payor and the
imposition of appropriate disciplinary action. 509 Failure to do so in
a timely manner can be viewed as an attempt to hide the overpay-
ment from the government. This provides an independent ground
for a criminal violation.
VI. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM
Given the elements and recommendations of a corporate
compliance program, the next question is how does a health care
entity develop and adopt a corporate compliance program? First, it
is important to note that failure to implement an effective corpo-
rate compliance program may result in liability under the responsi-
ble officer doctrine. In the case of In re Caremark International
Inc.,51 the court stated the following:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and re-
porting system, which the board concludes is adequate,
exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances
may... render a director liable for losses caused by non-
512compliance with applicable legal standards.
This statement exemplifies the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine. This doctrine imposes criminal punishment for an offi-• . 513
cer's failure to fulfill his corporate duties. A corporate official
with authority over matters that are regulated by criminal statutes
may be prosecuted for failing to act to remedy problems that de-
508. See id. at 44.
509. See id. at 50.
510. See id. at 50-51 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (3) (1994)).
511. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
512. Id. at 970.
513. See Kenny & Mitchelson, supra note 340, at 678-79 (citing United States v.
Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1990) andJeremy D. Heep, Adapting Re-
sponsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN. L. REv. 699 (1994)).
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velo ed even before they assumed their positions of responsibil-
ity.
Therefore, a successful corporate compliance program must
elicit the support of the board of directors ("Board") and CEO.
The Board and upper-level management must make corporate
compliance a priority. First, the Board should adopt a resolution
authorizing the creation of a corporate compliance program. The
resolution should record the date on which the health care entity1- 515
made a commitment to corporate compliance. After creation of
the compliance program, the Board should adopt another resolu-
516tion that officially approves and adopts the compliance program.
The Board must delegate oversight of the compliance pro-
gram. An audit committee and/or a compliance committee may
be formed. These committees may be given implementation, en-
forcement, and investigative powers. If the Board also retains some
oversight power, it should require regular reporting from the pro-
gram administrator and should consider significant complianceS 517
policy matters as agenda items when appropriate.
Most importantly, the CEO's involvement in the program sets
the tone for the compliance program.5 s A CEO may demonstrate
his commitment to the health care entity's compliance efforts by
distributing a code of conduct under his signature, by emphasizing
the importance of compliance efforts during meetings, and by
meeting with employees who are responsible for administering the
compliance program. 519 These actions will show that the health
care entity takes corporate compliance seriously.
2 0
Next, as stated previously, the health care entity must deter-
mine the areas of risk that the compliance program must address.
This may be accomplished by conducting an internal audit, which
includes interviewing management and employees, as well as exam-
ining the practices and standards within its own industry, and
should involve an attorney to have a legitimate argument for the
attorney-client privilege.12' The audit process to determine the ar-
514. See id. at 748-49.
515. See YOUNGBERG ET AL., supra note 495, at 112. This may also extend the
attorney-client privilege to the design of the compliance program. See id.
516. See id. at 114.
517. See Webb & Molo, supra note 278, at 384.
518. See id.
519. See id. at 384-85.
520. See id.
521. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 36.
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eas of risk should be as extensive as the intended compliance pro-
gram. The audit may include a review of the company's existing
and contemplated business activities, operations that pose a high
risk of litigation, past legal or ethical programs, current policies,
procedures, and compliance efforts. The health care entity
should also consider federal, state, and local law and regulation
523
that may impose criminal or civil liability. The health care entity
may prioritize its compliance efforts by first applying the corporate
compliance program to areas with the greatest legal risk. Other
risk areas may be added to the compliance program later when
time and money permit.
52
4
Next, the health care entity should decide what policies to im-
plement. The entity should consider "the size and bureaucracy of
the organization, the commitment of the officers and the board of
directors, and the financial and personnel resources available to
implement the compliance program. "52  The health care entity
522. SeeYOUNGBERGETAL., supra note 495, at 113.
523. See id. at 112. Such regulations and laws may include:
* False Claims Act and state or local counterparts;
* Anti-kickback Statute and state or local counterparts;
" Stark Law and state or local counterparts;
* Antitrust laws including but not limited to price information, referral,
and discriminatory pricing;
" Tax laws;
" Civil monetary penalties;
* Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO");
" Mail Fraud Statute;
" Wire Fraud Act;
* Government ethics, lobbying, and campaign finance statues and or-
dinances;
" Medical waste management;
" Employment discrimination and other employment-related laws such
as the Family Medical Leave Act, the American with Disabilities Act,
Compensation, leave time, harassment, Fair Labor Standards Act;
" Patient confidentiality statutes;
" Data transmission statutes;
" Billing standards;
* Patient Self-determination Act;
• Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA");
" Medicare/Medicaid patient program and protection acts;
* Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996;
* Safe Medical Device Act.
Id. at 111 (compiling a list in Exhibit 10-2).
524. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 36.
525. YOUNGBERG ETAL., supra note 495, at 113.
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must also establish the infrastructure to articulate its policies to its
employees and agents. Codes of conduct are a starting point, but
policies should also include employee training and procedures for
reporting violations. 6 Employee handbooks should contain the
policies. Again, these policies and handbooks should be easy to
read and understandable for employees of all reading levels.
52 7
The organization must implement a compliance program by
creating the necessary infrastructure. The personalities of the em-
ployee as well as their roles within the organization should be con-
sidered. Audit and/or corporate compliance committees may be
created. Compliance committees are the first tier of the structure
while managers and employees work to carry out the program.
Infrastructure must be established to enforce the compliance plan.
The compliance program must be flexible enough to permit the
adoption of new policies. The health care entity must be able to
change the compliance program if a new risk area develops. The
adaptability of the compliance program demonstrates that the
health care entity is making a sincere effort to comply with the
law.
52
VII. CONCLUSION
Those working in the health care industry must be mindful of
ongoing investigations and settlements that competitors reach with
the government. Review of investigations and settlements may be
beneficial because they may indicate the future of health care cor-
porate compliance. Since so much attention has been given to
corporate compliance, there should be several negotiations and
settlements available for review.
Future areas of corporate compliance programs may include
issues pertaining to:
(1) quality of care;
(2) denial of services by HMOs;
(3) HMO loss or denial of claims for necessary treatment
526. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 36.
527. SeeYOUNGBERGETAL., supra note 495, at 112.
528. Seeid.at 113.
529. See Davis & McFarland, supra note 274, at 36. The health care entity
should document all attempts, successes, and failures at engaging in a corporate
compliance program. SeeYOUNGBERG ET AL., supra note 495, at 114.
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including EMTALA violations and last-day denials;
(4) HMO denial of access to treatment;
(5) health system control of referrals;
(6) physician incentive plans; and
(7) research-related activities including experimental serv-
ices/clinical trials. °
Unlike prior compliance guidelines that pertained solely to
clinical laboratories, the government has given the health care in-
dustry compliance a solid beginning by setting forth guidelines that
establish the federal government's expectations when structuring
and implementing a corporate compliance program.
Corporate compliance cannot be viewed by the health care en-
tity as only a billing problem. Health care entities must acknowl-
edge that corporate compliance is an operational problem that re-
quires the implementation of sufficient internal infrastructure.
Ultimately, the health care entity must tailor the compliance pro-
gram to its individual needs. Adopting a corporate compliance
program is not enough. Knowledgeable individuals must be re-
cruited to oversee and enforce the adopted compliance plan. Cor-
porate compliance is the responsibility of every employee. The key
to a successful corporate compliance program is not the documents
creating the program, but the manner in which the program is car-
ried out."'
530. James Sheehan, Presentation at the Association of American Medical Col-
leges (Sept. 24, 1997).
531. SeeYOUNGBERGETAL., supra note 495, at 118.
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